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Context Sensitivity
William D. Araizat
"The moving picture screen, the radio, the newspaper, the
handbill, the sound truck and the street corner oratorhave differing
natures, values, abuses and dangers. Each, in my view, is a law
unto itself, and all we are dealing with now is the sound truck."1
"We deal here with the law of billboards."2
INTRODUCTION

Ten years ago, I wrote a short essay for another First
Amendment symposium.3 That essay considered three thenrecently decided cases-Citizens United v. FEC,4 Holder v.
HumanitarianLaw Project,5 and United States v. Stevens6-that
reflected the tension in the early Roberts Court between rigid
doctrinal rules and more context-specific standards in First
Amendment doctrine. This tension has been a longstanding one
in First Amendment law, as in other areas of constitutional law
and in law more generally.
That tension has not abated. Even though the Court, now
in the middle of the chief justice's second decade of leadership,
has firmly embraced rigid rules in the free speech context, that
embrace

has triggered

a responsive

echo

questioning

its

coherence and advisability. In recent years, the Court has
reaffirmed that free speech cases are governed by a tiered
t Stanley A. August Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. Thanks to Parker
Brown and Thu Nguyen for fine research assistance.
1 Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 97 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).
2
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 501 (1981) (White, J.,
plurality opinion) (stated immediately after quoting Justice Jackson's concurrence in Kovacs).
8
William D. Araiza, Citizens United, Stevens, and Humanitarian Law Project:
FirstAmendment Rules and Standardsin Three Acts, 40 STETSON L. REV. 821 (2011).
4 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
6 Holder v. Humanitarian L. Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010).
6 United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010).
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scrutiny approach,7 most notably, by insisting on a broad test for
content discriminations and, in turn, embracing strict scrutiny
for nearly all laws denominated as content based.9 While
scholars and judges have long debated the merits of a rigid
content-neutrality rule,10 the issue merits renewed discussion in
light of the Court's suggestion that its newly-broadened contentneutrality rule applies in full force to speech compulsions as well
as speech restrictions.,'
But the Court's embrace of categorical rules goes beyond
the content-neutrality rule to include holdings that determine
whether particular speech enjoys First Amendment protection at
all. In addition to the now decade-old endorsement of a rigid
historical test for identifying unprotected categories of speech (a
development I discussed in my 2011 essay),12 a more recent case
involving government speech joins earlier cases concerning the

speech of government employees in reflecting a similar impulse
toward categorical rules governing the scope of the First

7 Indeed, in 2021, the Court solidified this approach by explicitly discussing and
applying an approach that appears to be less stringent than strict scrutiny but nevertheless
more stringent than First Amendment intermediate scrutiny. See generally Ashutosh
Bhagwat, The Test that Ate Everything: Intermediate Scrutiny in First Amendment
Jurisprudence,2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 783 [hereinafter Bhagwat, The Test] (identifying a variety
of First Amendment tests as reflecting intermediate scrutiny). In Americans for Prosperity
Foundationv. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. 2373 (2021), the Court explained and applied what it called
"exacting scrutiny" in a way suggesting that the standard occupied the space between
intermediate and strict scrutiny. See discussion infra note 113.
8 See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 165-69 (2015) (holding that a law
is content based if either it is justified on the basis of content or it facially classifies based
on content, regardless of whether the law threatens to disfavor certain ideas).
9 See, e.g., Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 444 (2015) (applying strict
scrutiny to a state judicial ethics canon restricting judges' and judicial candidates' solicitation
of contributions). The qualifier "nearly" is necessary because the Court, at least for now, has
continued to apply less-than-strict scrutiny to content-based laws that are subject to special
First Amendment rules. See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011) (observing
that the law in question regulated commercial speech based on content but nevertheless
concluding that it was unnecessary to apply strict scrutiny because the law failed review even
under the Court's more deferential test for commercial speech regulation).
10
See, e.g., Hon. John Paul Stevens, The Freedom of Speech, 102 YALE L.J. 1293,
1304-08 (1993) (expressing skepticism about a rigid content-neutrality rule); Reed, 576 U.S.
at 167-68 (explaining why even innocently-motivated content discrimination justifies strict
scrutiny); Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 518
U.S. 727, 774 (1996) (Souter, J., concurring) ("Reviewing speech regulations under fairly strict
categorical rules keeps the starch in the standards for those moments when the daily politics
cries loudest for limiting what may be said."); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the
First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189 (1983) (examining the merits of rigid
standards); Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination and the First Amendment,
139 U. PA. L. REV. 615 (1991) (same).
11 See discussion of NIFLA v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018), in Section II.A2.
See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470-72 (2010); Araiza, supra note 3,
12
at 828-30 (discussing Stevens).
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Amendment's protections.13 Again, though, these moves have
prompted responsive echoes urging a different approach.

This article issues a caution about these more rigid First
Amendment doctrines. It argues that rigid applications of both the
content-neutrality rule and the precursor categorizations that feed
into that rule encourage results-driven analyses hidden beneath
the ostensible inquiries the Court performs. The result is analysis

that purports to be driven by those doctrinal imperatives but which
in fact likely reflects more factual or contextual considerations. The
fact that the Court's analyses hide those considerations, however,
renders these approaches problematic by generating purportedly

rigid, acontextual analyses that mask their true context sensitivity.
In hiding those real driving forces, such approaches deflect
whatever legitimate criticism might be directed at the
considerations that actually influenced the Court.
It is relatively easy to level these attacks. Claims that the
Court is using doctrine to hide its real agenda are nothing new. In
the First Amendment context, the harder question for critics of

these rigid approaches is what should take their place. A typical
response, offered by my 2011 First Amendment essay14 and by
many other scholars, is to suggest reliance on more foundational
standards grounding First Amendment law: what in another more
generally-focused essay I have referred to as "the law beyond the
rules"16 and what another scholar has described as "the direct
application of [a rule's] background principle or policy to a fact
situation."16 Offering a full-blown defense of any such alternative
approach is beyond the scope of this article, although it does offer
a possible solution.17 Instead, this article, as a contribution to a
symposium centered on two scholars' painstaking work in
cataloguing the Roberts Court's free speech jurisprudence to date,
seeks primarily to identify the continuing lack of resolution of the
tension my 2011 essay identified. It also seeks to counter any free
13 See Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 576 U.S. 200,
219-20 (2015) (categorizing speech on a state's specialty license plates as government speech
rather than private speech); Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006) (categorizing
speech made by a government employee as part of his job duties as falling outside the First
Amendment's protection); see also Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228, 238-42 (2015) (holding that
the First Amendment protected a government employee's court testimony even though he
learned the information about which he testified as part of his government job). But see id. at
247 (Thomas, J., concurring) (reserving the question of whether government employees whose
job duties include testifying enjoy similar First Amendment protection for their testimony).
14 See Araiza, supra note 3.
15 William D. Araiza, Justice Stevens and ConstitutionalAdjudication: The Law
Beyond the Rules, 44 LOY. LA. L. REV. 889, 889 (2011).
16 Kathleen Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106
HARv. L. REv. 22, 58 (1992).
17 See infra Part III.
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speech triumphalism that observers might be tempted to express
about the Roberts Court. For those aspiring to a truly meaningful
free speech right, the hard work remains to be done.
Part I of this article briefly surveys the landscape of the
Roberts Court's free speech jurisprudence. Part II considers cases
where the Court has manipulated or flirted with manipulating its
doctrinal rules. It first considers cases from 2010 and 2015 where
the Court upheld content-based speech restrictions despite
ostensibly applying strict or some other form of heightened
scrutiny. It then considers a 2018 case where the Court flirted with
applying strict scrutiny to all content-based speech compulsions
except for those it seemingly arbitrarily exempted. It concludes by
considering another 2015 case where the Court used a multi-factor,
context-specific standard but did so in the service of reaching a
binary yes-no decision about whether the speech in question was
governmental. That latter decision was outcome determinative,
thus making its rigidity all the more ironic in light of how the Court
reached its conclusion. Part III considers the lessons these cases
should teach to those for whom these rigid rules leave much to be
desired. It tentatively suggests that courts embrace more holistic
balancing tests that explicitly weigh the particular values and risks
that a case implicates. To be sure, such tests would raise their own
legitimate concerns about outcome-based decision-making. But
those tests' explicit recognition of those values and risks may make
them superior to, or at least a valuable complement to, the more
rigid rules the Roberts Court has embraced.
The epigrams at the start of this article reflect the context
sensitivity that stands at its normative core. Justice White's pithy
statement in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego-"We deal here
with the law of billboards"-nicely encapsulates that sensitivity.
The title of this article updates that statement to account for a more
recent case-Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate
Veterans, Inc.-where, as this article explains, the Court both
points toward a context-specific analysis in deciding the
government speech question at stake but does so in service of
reaching a rigid yes-no answer to that question. Perhaps instead
of a "government speech" doctrine, we should, as Justice White
implied, develop judicial doctrine governing the law of license
plates.18 And many more doctrines like it.

18 Cf. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 500-01 (1981)
(White, J., plurality opinion) ("This Court has often faced the problem of applying the
broad principles of the First Amendment to unique forums of expression. . .. These cases
support the cogency of Justice Jackson's remark in Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77, 97
(1949): Each method of communicating ideas is 'a law unto itself' and that law must
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THE ROBERTS COURT AND FREE SPEECH

The Roberts Court is often described as strongly pro-free
speech.19 Several high-profile cases support that characterization.
The Court has ruled in favor of offensive funeral picketers,20
corporations wishing to speak on political issues,21 non-union
member employees in unionized public-sector workplaces who
wish not to pay agency fees to unions,22 so-called sidewalk
counselors challenging state-mandated buffer zones around
abortion clinics,23 and anti-abortion "crisis pregnancy centers"
that refused to post state notices advertising the availability of
state-provided low-cost abortions.24 In doing so, it has often used
soaring free speech rhetoric.25 That rhetoric is buttressed by the
Court's methodologies-in particular, its insistence that most
(and, it seems, an increasing portion of)26 content-based speech
regulations be subject to strict scrutiny, its broad definition of

reflect the 'differing natures, values, abuses and dangers' of each method. We deal here
with the law of billboards." (footnote omitted)).
19 See, e.g., Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The First Amendment as a Procrustean
Bed? On How and Why Bright Line FirstAmendment Tests Can Stifle the Scope and Vibrancy
of DemocraticDeliberation,2020 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 145, 148 ("[T]he standard narrative holds
that the First Amendment's scope of application has never been broader."). Indeed, Chief
Justice Roberts has described himself as the Court's "most aggressive defender of the First
Amendment." Tony Mauro, Roberts Declares Himself First Amendment's Most Aggressive
Defender'
at
SCOTUS,
LAW.coM
(Feb.
13,
2019,
1:56
PM),
https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2019/02/13/roberts-declares-himself-first3
amendments-most-aggressive-defender-at-scotus/?slreturn=2019030 163203 [https:/perma.cc
/V96R-FW73]; see also Ronald KL. Collins & David L. Hudson, Jr., The Roberts Court-Its
FirstAmendment FreeExpression Jurisprudence:2005-2021, 87 BROOK. L. REV. 5, 21 (2021)
(noting that when Chief Justice Roberts was in the majority, as he was in 95 percent of First
Amendment cases, he assigned the opinion to himself approximately 29 percent of the time).
20 See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 460-61 (2011).
21 See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 468-72 (2010).
22 See Janus v. Am. Fed'n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S.
Ct. 2448, 2486 (2018).
23 See McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 496-97 (2014); id. at 511 (Alito, J.,
concurring in judgment).
24 See Nat'l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2368,
2375-78 (2018).
25
See, e.g., Snyder, 562 U.S. at 460-61 ("Speech is powerful. It can stir people
to action, move them to tears of both joy and sorrow, and-as it did here-inflict great
pain. On the facts before us, we cannot react to that pain by punishing the speaker. As
a Nation we have chosen a different course-to protect even hurtful speech on public
issues to ensure that we do not stifle public debate."); Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 339
("Speech is an essential mechanism of democracy, for it is the means to hold officials
accountable to the people. The right of citizens to inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use
information to reach consensus is a precondition to enlightened self-government and a
necessary means to protect it." (citation omitted)).
26 See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2366, 2371-72 (suggesting that strict scrutiny is
appropriate for content-based compulsions of speech, despite the fact that most speech
compulsions are content based); Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 566-71 (2011)
(suggesting that content-based commercial speech regulations should receive strict scrutiny).
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the content discrimination that triggers that scrutiny,27 and its
explicit rejection of what it called "ad hoc balancing" in
determining whether a category of speech falls outside the First
Amendment's protection.28
The Court's rhetorical commitment to free speech, its
adoption of doctrinal tests seemingly implementing that
commitment, and its application of those tests in high-profile cases
all suggest a Court that does indeed care about free speech.
Perhaps proving the point, scholars and dissenting justices have
criticized the Court for, in their view, "weaponizing" the First
Amendment as a tool for business interests.29 One does not critique
"weaponization" of a constitutional provision that is moribund.
Nevertheless,
other voices have questioned this
characterization. For example, Dean Erwin Chemerinsky has
insisted that the Roberts Court is "not a free speech Court at all."30
Among others, Dean Chemerinsky cited cases involving persons in
employment and custodial relationships with the government,
speech that implicates national security concerns, and speech that
the government can adopt as its own and thereby avoid First
Amendment scrutiny entirely.31 Those cases, in which the Court
ruled against the free speech claim, led Dean Chemerinsky to
charge that "when the government is functioning as an
authoritarian institution, freedom of speech always loses."32
This article does not directly enter the debate about the
extent to which the Roberts Court is, in fact, a free speech-friendly
Court. At one level, taking a position on that question requires a
commentator to stake out a value choice about his own favored
conception of free speech-to oversimplify, a choice between a
libertarian conception in which "free speech" consists of the

27 See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163-71 (2015) (defining content
discrimination to include facial content distinctions and not just laws that are motivated
by a desire to discriminate based on content).
28 See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010) (characterizing such
balancing as "startling and dangerous"); United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717 (2012)
(plurality opinion) (same, citing Stevens); Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass'n, 564 U.S. 786, 792
(2011) (same, citing Stevens).
29 See Janus v. Am. Fed'n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S.
Ct. 2448, 2501 (Kagan, J., dissenting); Kate Andrias, Janus's Two Faces, 2018 SUP. CT.
REV. 21, 21 ("Janusrepresents an unequivocal transition to what Justice Kagan termed
a 'weaponized' view of the First Amendment among the Court's majority .... ").
30
Erwin Chemerinsky, Not a Free Speech Court, 53 ARIz. L. REV. 723, 724 (2011);
see also Transcript, The Roberts Court and Free Speech Symposium, 87 BROOK. L. REV.
289, 343 (2021) [hereinafter Transcript, The Roberts Court Symposium].
31 See Chemerinsky, supra note 30, at 725; Transcript, The Roberts Court
Symposium, supra note 30, at 343.
82
Chemerinsky, supra note 30, at 725.
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absence of government restrictions on one's ability to speak,33 and
a more facilitative conception in which "free speech" consists of a
system in which government takes affirmative steps to create the
conditions under which all citizens have a reasonable opportunity
to make their voices heard34 and, indeed, an opportunity to hear a
variety of voices.36
But even assuming the correctness of the currently
ascendant libertarian conception of free speech, assessing the
Roberts Court's true adherence to free speech values raises
thorny methodological issues. Straightforward metrics for
deciding such questions are helpful, but ultimately inconclusive.
Perhaps the most obvious metric-simple case counts-does not
provide a reliable answer to this question, given different cases'
impacts on both speakers and speech rights. For example,
Citizens United was just one case: how can one measure its
impact on corporations' speech rights without an intensive,

empirical, and in some ways counterfactual examination of its
impact on the volume of corporate political speech?36 Other
cases, such as Reed v. Town of Gilbert, seemingly impact just a
few speakers affected by the Court's invalidation of one town's
speech restrictive ordinance; nevertheless, the impact of Reed's
broader definition of content discrimination has resonated
across many different contexts. 37
Relaxing the assumption in favor of such a libertarian
conception of free speech raises the further difficulty of
calculating the extent to which the Roberts Court's free speech
jurisprudence impairs some persons' speech rights. Campaign

finance cases illustrate this potential particularly strikingly. In
See, e.g., Joel M. Gora, Free Speech Matters: The Roberts Court and the First
33
Amendment, 25 J.L. & POL'Y 63, 83 (2016) (citing the "the libertarian and anticensorship
themes which have become a hallmark of Roberts Court First Amendment jurisprudence").
34 See, e.g., CAsS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 109 (2003)
(discussing the obligation of government to "promot[e] a well-functioning system of free
speech"); Genevieve Lakier, Imagining an Antisubordinating First Amendment, 118
COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2139-40 (2018) ("[T]he answer to the ills that beset contemporary
free speech law is not less constitutional protection for speech but a different kind of
constitutional protection: one that reduces, rather than reinforces, the inequalities in
expressive opportunity that are a consequence of the highly, and increasingly, unequal
distribution of economic and political power in the United States.").
35 See, e.g., Red Lion Broad. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 395 U.S. 367, 390, 396
(1969) (upholding an FCC rule requiring broadcasters to give equal time to opposing
viewpoints when covering public issues in order to ensure that the listening public is
exposed to a wide range of viewpoints).
36 For one attempt at such an analysis, see Richard Hasen, The Decade of Citizens
United, SLATE (Dec. 19, 2019), httpsJ/slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/12/citizens-uniteddevastating-impact-american-politics.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2021).
37 See, e.g., Note, Free Speech DoctrineAfter Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 129 HARV.
L. REV. 1981, 1982 (2016) (discussing Reed's possible impact across a variety of contexts,
including commercial speech, restrictions on panhandling, and sign ordinances).
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Citizens United itself, the Court's vindication of corporate speech
rights arguably diminishes the speech of citizens whose speech
is now (potentially) drowned out in the tsunami of corporate
political speech the case (might have) unleashed.3s Even more
directly, in Davis v. FEC, the Court struck down a law that
allowed candidates to collect and spend more money for
campaign speech if their opponents self-financed over a
particular threshold.39 Thus, in vindicating the self-financed
candidate's right not to be (relatively) burdened by his own
speech activities, the Court directly squelched the speech of
other candidates and their supporters. Yet the case goes in the
books as a win for the free speech plaintiff. For these reasons,
counting cases, while certainly useful in the construction of a
database for study like the one Ronald Collins and David
Hudson constructed for this symposium,40 does not fully and
satisfactorily answer the question of whether the Court is
fundamentally free speech friendly.
Another approach to assessing the Roberts Court's free
speech record may take the form of considering the messages the
Court sends via its rhetoric and accompanying doctrinal tests.
While the First Amendment has long been a favored location for
lofty judicial rhetoric,41 as noted earlier,42 the Roberts Court has,
at the very least, indulged in its share of that rhetoric-and
maybe more than its share. While Justice Kennedy was perhaps
particularly susceptible to rhetorical flights when writing First
Amendment opinions,43 Chief Justice Roberts has been no slouch
38 See, e.g., Justin Levitt, Confronting the Impact of Citizens United, 29 YALE
J.L. & POL'Y 217, 222-24 (2016) (discussing this possibility); see also GREGORY
MAGARIAN, MANAGED SPEECH: THE ROBERTS COURT'S FIRST AMENDMENT 235-53 (2017)
(arguing that the Roberts Court has favored corporate and government speakers at the
expense of relatively powerless ones).
39 Davis v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 554 U.S. 724, 736, 740-44 (2008).
40
See generally Collins & Hudson, supra note 19 (accumulating the free speech
decisions of the Roberts Court).
41 See, e.g., ARTHUR D. HELLMAN ET AL., FIRST AMENDMENT LAW: FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION AND FREEDOM OF RELIGION vii (4th ed., Carolina Acad. Press 2018) ("No
other area of law [beyond the First Amendment] has so often inspired the Justices of the
Supreme Court to write opinions marked by eloquence and passion.").
42 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
43 See, e.g., Nat'l Inst. Of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2379
(2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("The California Legislature included in its official
history [of the law NIFLA struck down] the congratulatory statement that the Act was
part of California's legacy of 'forward thinking.' But it is not forward thinking to force
individuals to 'be an instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological point of
view [they] fin[d] unacceptable.' It is forward thinking to begin by reading the First
Amendment as ratified in 1791; to understand the history of authoritarian government
as the Founders then knew it; to confirm that history since then shows how relentless
authoritarian regimes are in their attempts to stifle free speech; and to carry those
lessons onward as we seek to preserve and teach the necessity of freedom of speech for
the generations to come. Governments must not be allowed to force persons to express a
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when it comes to wrapping himself in the First Amendment's
flag.44 Still, rhetorical flourishes are even harder than bare case
outcomes to assess for their impact on free speech rights. Even
more importantly, such flourishes may emphasize a particular
understanding of free speech that may be very different from one
a commentator or observer finds attractive.4e
Perhaps, then, one should refer instead to the doctrinal
tests that accompany those case results and that rhetoric. At the
very least, the limited number of tests governing free speech cases
provides a more manageable data set by which to judge the Roberts
Court's record. On this score, an initial investigation again
suggests the truth of the assertion that the Roberts Court is indeed
speech protective (but, to repeat, only if one adopts a particular
vision of free speech).46 First, the Court has reaffirmed the
centrality of the content-neutrality rule requiring strict judicial
scrutiny for laws that discriminate based on content. 47 This
reaffirmation was not a given: Justices Kagan and Breyer often
argue, as did Justice Stevens, that the content-neutrality rule is
ultimately merely a useful heuristic-what Breyer has called a
"rule of thumb"48-that should not take on outsized importance in
First Amendment cases. 49 But the Roberts Court has reaffirmed
that rule, even in the face of these calls for a more holistic approach
to free speech that ultimately seeks to determine whether the
government is trying to suppress the expression of ideas.60
message contrary to their deepest convictions. Freedom of speech secures freedom of
thought and belief. This law imperils those liberties." (second and third alterations in
original) (citations omitted)).
" See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 460-61 (2011) ("Speech is powerful. It
can stir people to action, move them to tears of both joy and sorrow, and-as it did hereinflict great pain. On the facts before us, we cannot react to that pain by punishing the
speaker. As a Nation we have chosen a different course-to protect even hurtful speech on
public issues to ensure that we do not stifle public debate.").
4
See supra text accompanying notes 33-35.
4 See supra text accompanying notes 33-35.
47 See, e.g., Barr v. Am. Ass'n of Pol. Consultants, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 2335,
2346-47 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., Alito & Thomas, J.J., plurality
opinion) (concluding that a restriction on robocalls, when combined with an exception for
calls seeking to collect on debts owed to the federal government, was content based and
thus required strict scrutiny); id. at 2363-64 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in judgment in part
and dissenting in part) (agreeing that the law was content based and failed strict scrutiny).
4
See, e.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 176 (2015) (Breyer, J.,
concurring in judgment).
49 Id. at 181-83 (Kagan, J., concurring in judgment) (arguing that contentbased rules should trigger strict scrutiny only when they implicate underlying concerns
about government attempts to interfere with the free exchange of ideas); see also
Stevens, supra note 10, at 1304-08 (Justice Stevens expressing skepticism about a rigid
content-neutrality rule).
0 Of course, just because a doctrinal rule favors free speech does not necessarily
make it desirable. Many scholars, and several justices, have decried the so-called
Lochnerization of the First Amendment, in which the Court's embrace of a strongly pro-free
speech approach comes at the expense of the government's ability to regulate everyday social
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Indeed, the Roberts Court has not only reaffirmed the
content-neutrality rule, but has moved to widen its domain.51 In
2015, the Court adopted a broader definition of the content
discrimination that triggers strict scrutiny, despite protests that
the Court's expanded rule did little to further its underlying
concern

with

preventing government

from

suppressing the

expression of disfavored ideas.62 In 2018, it walked up to the very
precipice of applying that rule in compelled speech cases, in the face
of Justice Breyer's objection that doing so would doom most speech
3
compulsions, since most of them compel particular content. Just
as strikingly, the Court in 2011 suggested, without actually

deciding, that restrictions on commercial speech normally subject
to the presumably more deferential Central Hudson test should
4
receive strict scrutiny when they classify based on content.6 This
suggestion again elicited the objection that applying the content-

neutrality rule to commercial speech restrictions essentially
55
swallowed the relevant overall commercial speech test. The
dissenters in that 2011 case raised this objection based on their
observation that, as with speech compulsions, most commercial
speech restrictions identify the particular speech-that is, the
particular advertising-to which the restrictions apply.56
But the Roberts Court has done more than reaffirm and
extend the domain of previously existing rules like the contentneutrality rule. It has also made new doctrine, in a speechand economic life. See, e.g., Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 133,
177-79; Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 590-92 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
5' See William D. Araiza, Invasion of the Content-Neutrality Rule, 2019
BYU L. REV. 875, 876-88 (2020).
See Reed, 576 U.S. at 163-64 (concluding that a law was content based not
52
only if it was justified based on the content of the regulated speech but also if the law
facially classified on the basis of that content); id. at 181-83 (Kagan, J., concurring in
judgment) (expressing disagreement with that broader definition).
53
See Nat'l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2371 (2018)
(identifying the speech compulsion at issue as content based); id. at 2371-75 (rejecting the
lower court's conclusion that the speech's status as professional speech justified according the
law something less than strict scrutiny); id. at 2375 (holding that it was unnecessary to decide
whether professional speech in fact warranted an exception from "ordinary First Amendment
principles" because the law failed intermediate scrutiny). But see id. at 2380 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) ("Virtually every disclosure law could be considered content based, for virtually
every disclosure law requires individuals to speak a particular message." (internal quotation
marks omitted)); id. at 2381 (citing an example of a city ordinance requiring landlords to
disclose the procedures for garbage disposal to tenants).
54 See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 571-72 (2011) (cautioning that
content-based laws are presumptively unconstitutional, concluding that the law in question was
content based, but declining to apply strict scrutiny because the ordinary commercial speech test
was sufficient to invalidate the law). For a description of the test normally applicable to
commercial speech regulations, see CentralHudson Gas & Electric Corporationv. PublicService
Commission of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980); and IMS Health, 564 U.S. at 572.
55 See IMS Health, 564 U.S. at 587-88 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
56 See id. at 589-90.
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protective direction. Most notably, the Court has firmly
established that the canonical. list of unprotected speech
categories laid out in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire67 reflect
determinations about their historical lack of First Amendment
protection, rather than an explicit judicial weighing of the value
of a given category of speech against the social harms it
generates. In three cases decided in three consecutive terms, the
Court firmly enshrined this historical methodology.6s
It is fair to consider that move a speech-protective one. A
more ad hoc judicial balancing process always threatens to weigh
unpopular and unpleasant speech-for example, lies about
military honors,69 violent video games,60 and animal cruelty
depictions,61 to recount the subjects of those three cases-against
both undeniable societal interests tied to speech suppression and
the political clamor for regulation that likely impelled enactment
of the law in question. In other words, ad hoc balancing presents
an attractive vehicle for finding speech unprotected.2 A historical
approach, perhaps, could resist contemporary clamors for speech
restrictions, even if it may not reflect an accurate accounting of the
genesis of the Chaplinsky categories.63
To be sure, other Roberts Court doctrinal innovations,
such as its development of rules regarding government speech
and the speech rights of government employees, cut in the other
direction.64 Nevertheless, at first glance, the Court's doctrinal
choices seem to paint a picture of a Court that is fundamentally
speech protective (again, at least if one adopts a particular vision
7 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) ("There are
certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and
punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.
These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or
'fighting' words-those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an
immediate breach of the peace." (footnote omitted)).
as See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717 (2012) (plurality opinion);
Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass'n, 564 U.S. 786, 791-92 (2011); United States v. Stevens, 559
U.S. 460, 470 (2010).
9
See generally Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (holding that a federal law prohibiting
lying about receiving military decorations or medals was unconstitutional).
6
See generally Ent. Merchs., 564 U.S. 786 (invalidating a state law that
barred the sale or rental of violent video games to minors).
61 See generally Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (striking down a federal statute that
prohibited the commercial creation, sale, or possession of animal cruelty depictions).
62 See Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment,
85 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 485 (1985). Cf. Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc.
v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 518 U.S. 727, 774 (1996) (Souter, J., concurring) ("Reviewing
speech regulations under fairly strict categorical rules keeps the starch in the standards
for those moments when the daily politics cries loudest for limiting what may be said.").
6 See Genevieve Lalyer, The Invention of Low-Value Speech, 128 HARV. L. REV.
2166, 2177 (2015) (casting doubt on the historical foundations of the Chaplinsky categories).
4 See Chemerinsky, supra note 30, at 725-27 (discussing government employees'
speech); id. at 730-32 (discussing the government speech doctrine).
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of free speech).66 But the question requires more analysis. If
those doctrines allow for results-based manipulation, then their
speech-protective promise also allows the Court to hide its real
analysis in free speech cases. That latter potential is particularly
concerning if those doctrines enable the Court to uphold popular
but problematic speech restrictions as simple applications of
generally speech-protective rules. In other words, speechprotective rules might allow at least some speech restrictions to
be upheld without the sort of explicit balancing that attends
more holistic tests. In turn, the lack of such transparency makes
possible results-oriented decisions that hide their true
motivations. This article considers that troubling possibility.
II.

THE ROBERTS COURT'S DOCTRINAL MANIPULATIONS

On occasion, the Roberts Court has manipulated free
speech doctrine in ways that obscure what appear to be the likely
rationales underlying its decisions. The first subsection of this part
considers two examples of the Court upholding content-based
speech restrictions in ways that suggest deviations from its
traditional rule subjecting such restrictions to strict scrutiny.66 The
second subsection considers the Court's flirtation, in a 2018 case,
with a rule that would subject most content-based speech
compulsions to strict scrutiny.67 While that case added disclaimers
and limitations to any such rule it might announce in a future case,
the rhetoric it' employed-and the rhetoric it chose not to employsuggests that it may be laying the groundwork for creating a new
compelled-speech doctrine that leaves room for similar
manipulations. Finally, the third subsection considers a 2015 case
that found the speech in question to be government speech.68 While
that case used a holistic, multifactor analysis to decide that the
speech was governmental rather than private, its very acceptance
of a rigid binary between government and private speech again
leaves open room for outcome-based manipulation.

65

See supra text accompanying note 46.
See infra Section II.A.1 for discussion of Holder v. HumanitarianLaw Project,
561 U.S. 1 (2010), and Williams-Yulee v. FloridaBar, 575 U.S. 433 (2015).
67 See infrm Section IIA.2 for discussion of NIFLA v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
68 See infra Section Il.B for discussion of Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of
Confederate Veterans, Inc., 576 U.S. 200 (2015).
66
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The Manipulationof Strict Scrutiny

Scholars of equal protection law often accuse the Court of
deviating from its ostensible three-tiered scrutiny structure.69
The argument is a familiar one. Rational basis review can take

the form of a toothless, tautological review in which the effect of
the challenged law furnishes its own justification,70 or the wellknown (and sometimes judicially recognized)71 "rational basis
with bite."72 Intermediate scrutiny has been applied in a way
that locates it in a truly intermediate position in the three-tiered
structure, 73 but also in a way that appears to require a nearperfect fit between the law and the asserted justificationsomething normally associated with strict scrutiny.74 For its
part, strict scrutiny can impose fit and justification
requirements that render it exceptionally difficult to satisfy,76
but has also been applied in ways that accord significant
deference to the government's judgments.76
Similar manipulations mark the Roberts Court's use of
strict scrutiny in its free speech jurisprudence.
69 See, e.g., Katie R. Eyer, Constitutional Crossroads and the Canon of Rational
Basis Review, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 527, 529 (2014) (noting the difficulty of classifying
the standard of review the Court has used in gay rights cases); see also United States v.
Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 574 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority in
an important sex equality equal protection clause case had muddied the applicable
standard by which courts judge sex classifications).
70 See, e.g., United States R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 186-87 (1980)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (accusing the majority of applying rational basis review in this way).
Fritz involved amendments to a federal railroad worker retirement scheme that
disadvantaged particulargroups of workers. Id. at 168-74 (majority opinion). On at least one
reading, the Court found a legitimate interest to which the law was rationally related in the
actual classifications the law drew. Id. at 176-78. As Justice Brennan noted in his dissent,
this approach created a tautology, in which the very classifications the law drew provided a
potential justification underlying those classifications-a situation in which, as Justice
Brennan noted, the law would always not just be rationally related to that hypothesized
justification but would always fit perfectly. Id. at 186-87 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
71 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579-80 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring in
judgment) ("When a law exhibits . .. a desire to harm a politically unpopular group, we have
applied a more searching form of rational basis review to strike down such laws under the
Equal Protection Clause.").
72
See, e.g., Raphael Holoszyc-Pimentel, Note, Reconciling Rational Basis
Review: When Does Rational Basis Bite?, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2070 (2015) (analyzing the
Court's "rational-basis-with-bite cases" through the 2014 term).
73 See, e.g., Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 509-10 (1976) (applying relatively
deferential review to a legitimacy classification); Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988)
(describing Lucas as applying intermediate scrutiny).
74 See, e.g., Virginia, 518 U.S. at 542-46 (1996); id. at 573 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the majority's analysis meant that the presence of one woman
willing and able to undertake education at Virginia Military Institute meant that the
school's exclusion of women applicants failed intermediate scrutiny).
76
See, e.g., City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507-08(1989) (applying
stringent requirements on a city seeking to adopt a race-based contracting set-aside).
76
See, e.g., Grutterv. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003) (deferring to a public
university's judgment that racial diversity was necessary to its educational mission).
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1. Applying the Content-Neutrality Rule
Consider first the content-neutrality rule. The familiar
structure of scrutiny levels for particular types of speech
restrictions-relatively deferential scrutiny for content-neutral
laws, strict scrutiny for content-based laws, and nearly fatal
scrutiny for viewpoint-based laws77-features a similar
variability as its equal protection cousin.78 A preliminary
problem with this structure is the Court's unwillingness to be
held to it in difficult cases. For example, in Holder v.
HumanitarianLaw Project, the Court, speaking through Chief
Justice Roberts, explicitly concluded that what it called
"intermediate scrutiny" of the challenged speech restriction was
insufficiently stringent in light of the law's content
discrimination. 79Nevertheless, even though it stated that "more
demanding" scrutiny was required,80 the Court refrained from
calling that scrutiny "strict" (not even mentioning that term)81
despite observing that the law was content based. One is
reminded of Justice Scalia's complaint in United States v.
Virginia, the seminal 1996 sex equality equal protection case,

that the majority's statement and application of what it called
intermediate scrutiny amounted to a game of "Supreme Court
peek-a-boo."82

77 See, e.g., Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 469 (2009) ("[A]ny
restriction based on the content of the speech must satisfy strict scrutiny ... and
restrictions based on viewpoint are prohibited."); Bhagwat, The Test, supra note 7, at
784 (discussing the evolution of tiers of scrutiny in free speech law); Maura Douglas,
Finding Viewpoint Neutrality in Our Constitutional Constellation, 20 U. PA. J. CON. L.
727, 729 (2018) (noting the particularly stringent "strict scrutiny" applied to laws that
discriminate based on viewpoint).
78 See generally Bhagwat, The Test, supra note 7, for one scholar's
identification of a variety of different First Amendment doctrinal tests that have been
lumped under the category of "intermediate scrutiny." The tests include one-the test
for so-called secondary effects-that the Supreme Court has phrased in deferential
terms, see City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986), and other tests,
such as the one for commercial speech, that the Court has applied significantly more
stringently, see, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001) (applying the
Central Hudson test to state restriction on tobacco ads and sales). This article does not
consider the variability in those tests, although it does refer to the lumping of those tests
as the same sort of problem this article explores in other contexts. See infra Part III and
notes 228-229 and accompanying text.
79 See Holder v. Humanitarian L. Project, 561 U.S. 1, 26-27 (2010).
80 See id. at 28 (quoting approvingly an earlier case stating that "we must
[apply] a more demanding standard" (alteration in original) (quoting Texas v. Johnson,
491 U.S. 397, 403 (1989))).
81 But see HumanitarianL., 561 U.S. at 45 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (using that term).
82 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 574 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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The likely reason for the Humanitarian Law Court's
failure to call what it was doing "strict scrutiny"83 emerges when
one reads the rest of the majority opinion and finds in it a heavy
dose of deference to the political branches.84 To be sure, such
deference may have been appropriate. Humanitarian Law
concerned the constitutionality of a statute that prohibited
persons from providing "material support" to designated terrorist
organizations.85 The need for that prohibition turned heavily on
Congress's and the president's knowledge of foreign affairs and
the national security risks such support posed.86 The Court clearly
understood the need to defer to the political branches'
understanding of such national security and foreign policy
questions.87 One can thus understand Chief Justice Roberts's
desire to refrain from calling what he was doing "strict scrutiny,"
given that term's requirement that the government convincingly

demonstrate that the law served the highest public needs.88
Nevertheless, the chief justice's explanation of the standard
he was applying creates significant confusion. By explicitly
rejecting as inadequate what he called "intermediate scrutiny,"89
he was left with the choice of either applying strict scrutiny or
embracing a standard somewhere between intermediate and strict
scrutiny. As explained above,90 he never explicitly made that
choice. To be sure, he cited an earlier case, Texas v. Johnson,91 for
the proposition that, when a law is not properly analyzed under the

88
But see infra note 95 and accompanying text (citing post-Humanitarian Law
opinions that did refer to that case as applying strict scrutiny).
84 See HumanitarianL., 561 U.S. at 33-36. To be sure, the Court's discussion
of its deference to presidential and congressional national security judgments came after
the Court reached a similar conclusion on its own. See id. at 29-33. However, much of
that earlier analysis relied on an affidavit submitted by the government. See id.; see also
Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass'n, 564 U.S. 786, 855 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (describing
the majority in Humanitarian Law as "deferring, while applying strict scrutiny, to the
Government's national security judgments").
8
Humanitarian L., 561 U.S. at 8 (quoting the statute).
8
See id. at 33-36 (according deference to the political branches' estimations
of the foreign affairs issues implicated by the regulated conduct).
8? See supra note 84.
88 See, e.g., Ent. Merchs., 564 U.S. at 799 ("Because the Act imposes a
restriction on the content of protected speech, it is invalid unless [the state] can
demonstrate that it passes strict scrutiny-that is, unless it is justified by a compelling
government interest and is narrowly drawn to serve that interest."); id. at 804
(describing the "compelling government interest" requirement as demanding a "high
degree of necessity"); id. at 799-804 (rejecting the state's evidence in support of the
challenged content-based regulation of violent video games and concluding, based on
that rejection, that the law was both overinclusive and underinclusive and thus failed
the "narrowly drawn" requirement).
89 Humanitarian L., 561 U.S. at 27-28.
90 See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
91 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
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intermediate scrutiny of United States v. O'Brien,92 something
"more demanding" is required.93 But even that statement cloaks
the actual scrutiny the Court exercised in HumanitarianLaw: in
Johnson, the Court concluded that the "more demanding" review
equated to "the most exacting scrutiny."94 Yet Chief Justice Roberts
never cited that latter phrase or Johnson's use of it.9B Adding to the
confusion, after HumanitarianLaw, majority opinions (including
one he wrote) and individual justices have referred to the scrutiny
applied in that case as "strict."96 The elusive and constantly-shifting
standards present here remind one of the shell game Times Square
barkers used to play to separate tourists from their money.97
Five years after HumanitarianLaw, the Court, in a much
more straightforward but still troubling exhibition of doctrinal
inconsistency, upheld a speech restriction after explicitly applying
strict scrutiny. In Williams- Yulee v. FloridaBar, the Court upheld a
Florida judicial ethics canon prohibiting judges and candidates for
92 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
93 HumanitarianL., 561 U.S. at 28 (quoting Johnson, 491 U.S. at 403).
94 See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 412.
98 See HumanitarianL., 561 U.S. at 28 (citing the page in Johnson where the
Court merely stated that finding that O'Brien did not apply thereby required "more
demanding" review).
96 McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 478 (2014) (Roberts, C.J., majority
opinion); Nat'l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2374 (2018)
(Thomas, J., majority opinion); Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass'n, 564 U.S. 786, 847-48
(Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 444 (Roberts,
C.J., majority opinion) (describing HumanitarianLaw as a case that required the
government to show that the challenged law was "narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
government interest"-the elements of strict scrutiny).
97 To be sure, the "most exacting scrutiny" standard from Johnson probably
does equate to strict scrutiny, since what seems to be its more deferential neighbor,
"exacting scrutiny," appears to occupy the space between intermediate and strict
scrutiny. See infra note 111 for discussion of how the Court discussed "exacting scrutiny"
in Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. 2373 (2021). Thus, if
"exacting scrutiny" incorporates intermediate scrutiny's "substantial relation" test but
also requires narrow tailoring, then presumably "the most exacting scrutiny" standard
requires something more, which one would think can only be full-on strict scrutiny
(unless that latter standard creates yet another way station between intermediate and
strict scrutiny). This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that Johnson announced "the
most exacting" scrutiny standard immediately after observing that the challenged
speech restriction was content based. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 412. As a matter of
transitive logic, if Humanitarian Law really did adopt the Johnson standard and
Johnson's "most exacting scrutiny" standard really does equal strict scrutiny, then
HumanitarianLaw really did apply strict scrutiny. Nevertheless, the chief justice never
uttered the term "strict scrutiny" in HumanitarianLaw, even though he was perfectly
willing to do so in his opinion in McCullen, 573 U.S. at 478, and to state the components
of strict scrutiny in Williams-Yulee, 575 U.S. at 444, in both cases citing Humanitarian
Law as precedent. When pondering the reason for this obliqueness, one inevitably
suspects that it has to do with the fact that HumanitarianLaw reflected significant
deference to the government in contravention of the basic principles of strict scrutiny.
See Humanitarian L., 561 U.S. at 48, 55, 62 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (faulting the
government for lack of, respectively, "detail," "specific facts," and "specific evidence"
supporting its justification for the challenged speech restriction).
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judicial office from personally requesting campaign donations.98 As
a content-based law limiting what judges and judicial candidates
could say, eight justices agreed that the law merited strict scrutiny.99
Four of those justices found that scrutiny to be satisfied.100 After
concluding that Florida had a compelling interest in ensuring the
perceived integrity of the judicial system, Chief Justice Roberts, now
speaking for a five-justice majority, rejected arguments that the

canon was underinclusive because it allowed speech by the
campaign and also by a candidate if her speech did not request
campaign contributions.101 The Court acknowledged that such
about the
could suggest concerns
underinclusivenessO2
in
accomplishing
effectiveness
law's
or
the
motive
government's true
the stated end.10s However, it concluded that the canon "aims
squarely at the conduct most likely to undermine public confidence
in the integrity of the judiciary."104 It also rejected overinclusiveness
arguments, concluding that the canon allowed many ways for judges
and judicial candidates to seek contributions and imposed no limits
at all on speech unrelated to campaign finance.10
Dissenting, Justice Scalia had none of this. He accused the
majority of employing a definition of judicial integrity that shifted
as it confronted different arguments about the conduct judicial
candidates might engage in.106 Demonstrating the proof burdens
strict scrutiny sometimes imposes on the government, he also

questioned the empirical basis for the Court's conclusion that

98

Williams-Yulee, 575 U.S. at 444.

99 See id. at 444 (Roberts, C.J., joined by Breyer, Sotomayor, & Kagan, JJ.,
plurality opinion); id. at 462-63 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 478
(Kennedy, J., dissenting); id. at 479 (Auto, J., dissenting).
100 Justice Ginsburg concurred in the decision upholding the canon, but did not
join the part of Chief Justice Roberts's opinion calling for strict scrutiny. Instead, she
adhered to her previously expressed view that judicial campaign speech was legitimately
subject to more intrusive government restrictions. See id. at 457-58 (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
101 See id. at 448-52 (majority opinion). Beyond more general speech, the canon
also allowed a candidate to write thank-you notes for contributions, which of course
required the candidate to be aware of who had contributed to her campaign. See id. at 440.
102 In the First Amendment context, underinclusiveness refers to a law's failure
to regulate all the speech that causes the harm the government cites as the reason for
the challenged law. See, e.g., id. at 448-49 (discussing the reasons an underinclusive law
may be problematic from a First Amendment perspective). By contrast, an overinclusive
law is one that that regulates more speech than necessary to resolve the problem the
government cites as the reason for the challenged law. A law can sometimes be deemed
to be both underinclusive and overinclusive. See, e.g., Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass'n, 564
U.S. 786, 801-04 (2011) (finding both of these flaws in the same law); see also infra notes
107-108 and accompanying text (citing Justice Scalia's arguments that the ethics canon
upheld in Williams-Yulee was both underinclusive and overinclusive).
103
Williams-Yulee, 575 U.S. at 448-49.
104 Id. at 449.
100 Id. at 452-55.
106
See id. at 465 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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limiting such personal solicitations would improve the public's
confidence in the judiciary.107 He further questioned the fit between
the canon and the state's goals (however defined). In particular, he
noted the breadth of its prohibition on solicitations (including, for
example, even the candidate's parents and, at the other extreme,
publicly addressed fundraising appeals)108 and, at the same time,
its underinclusiveness (by prohibiting appeals for campaign
contributions but allowing appeals for personal gifts or loans).109
At the end of his dissent, Justice Scalia identified what he
thought was the underlying motivation for what he perceived as
the Court's inappropriately deferential scrutiny. Recalling the
Court's then-recent set of cases protecting troubling speech even in
the face of legitimately-grounded government interests-cases
protecting "depictions of animal torture, sale of violent video games
to children, and lies about having won military medals"110-he
accused the Court of making an exception to free speech doctrine
for judicial campaign speech simply because of its hostility to the
practice of electing judges.",

HumanitarianLaw and Williams-Yulee are only two cases.
In other cases, the Roberts Court has applied a version of strict
scrutiny that truly demands a compelling interest and a narrow fit,
striking down laws because of their failure to satisfy those
requirements."' Still, the relative deference of both the "more
demanding than intermediate scrutiny" applied in Humanitarian
Law and the explicitly identified strict scrutiny applied in
Williams- Yulee demands an explanation. After all, the entire point
of any scrutiny standard is to accord equivalent treatment to
factually dissimilar cases that nevertheless trigger the same level
of judicial review.113
107
See id. at 466-67; see also Ent. Merchs., 564 U.S. at 799-804 (imposing similarly
rigorous proof requirements on the government as part of an application of strict scrutiny).
108 See Williams-Yulee, 575 U.S. at 467-68 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
109 See id. at 469-73.
110 Id. at 473.
111 See id.
112 See, e.g., Ent. Merchs., 564 U.S. 786, 799-805 (2011) (state law banning the
sale or rental of violent video games to minors); Ariz. Free Enter. Club's Freedom PAC
v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 727-28, 748-55 (2011) (state law granting additional monies
to publicly funded candidates who were outspent by privately financed candidates).
113 In 2021, the Court appeared to formally establish a level of scrutiny
somewhere between intermediate and strict, applicable to restrictions on associational
rights. In Americans for Prosperity Foundation u. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. 2373 (2021), the
Court struck down a California law requiring charities to disclose to the government
their largest contributors. A five-justice majority, speaking yet again through Chief
Justice Roberts, applied what it called "exacting scrutiny," which it described as
requiring "a substantial relation between the disclosure requirement and a sufficiently
important governmental interest." Id. at 2384 (quoting Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 196
(2010)). A majority explicitly rejected the plaintiffs' argument that such scrutiny
required the state to promote its goals by means least restrictive of the First Amendment

2021]

FREE SPEECHCONTEXT SENSITIVITY

265

A candid answer to the question about Humanitarian
Law's and Williams-Yulee's deviation from normal strict
scrutiny review would likely cite those cases' factual contexts:
respectively, national security and the special demands of
judicial integrity.114 It is a fair answer. After all, the Court has
often insisted that "context matters" when evaluating the
constitutionality of racial classifications under equal
protection's strict scrutiny standard.i5 There is no reason
context should not similarly matter in First Amendment
scrutiny. Nevertheless, trust in scrutiny standards requires
that the idiosyncrasies of particular factual contexts influence
outcomes only via the sincere application of those standards. In
other words, if a content-based law is held to satisfy strict
scrutiny, it should be because, even in light of its context, the
law truly was narrowly tailored to satisfy a compelling
government interest and not because the Court thought the law

&

interests at stake, but it did require that the law be narrowly tailored, thus suggesting
the place of "exacting scrutiny" as a level of scrutiny between intermediate and strict.
See id. at 2383.
Americansfor Prosperityraises as many questions as it answers. First, while
the Court rejected a least-restrictive-means requirement, the majority later wrote that
the state "must ... demonstrate its need for . .. production [of the required information]
in light of any less intrusive alternatives." Id. at 2386. This statement at least suggests
some residual ambiguity in the Court's explanation of what "exacting" scrutiny requires
and how it relates to strict scrutiny. Second, and relatedly, the Court left unaddressed
the question of how "exacting scrutiny" relates to what in other cases it called "the most
exacting scrutiny," a scrutiny level that has generally been understood to approach or be
the equivalent of strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) ("Our
cases indicate that as a content-based restriction on political speech in a public forum,
[the challenged law] must be subjected to the most exacting scrutiny. Thus, we have
required the State to show that the 'regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state
interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end."' (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n
v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983))); United States v. Alvarez, 567
U.S. 709, 724 (2012) (plurality opinion) ("In assessing content-based restrictions on
protected speech, the Court . .. has applied the 'most exacting scrutiny."' (quoting
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994))); see also
Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 724 (plurality opinion) (referring, in the sentence immediately
following the one quoted in the last citation, to mere "exacting scrutiny"). See also supra
discussion in note 97 for a discussion of what "the most exacting scrutiny" entails.
Finally, despite Americans for Prosperity's firm foundation in the First
Amendment right of association, rather than right to free speech, the Court has
previously applied "exacting scrutiny" in cases that appeared to rest on a combination of
speech and associational rights claims. See, e.g., Janus v. Am. Fed'n of State, Cnty.,
Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2464-65 (2018). This fact raises questions
about whether and to what degree the standard established in Americans for Prosperity
will apply to pure free speech cases that have used similar verbiage. Together, these
questions suggest that Americans for Prosperity does not greatly clarify free speech law.
14
See, e.g., Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 872, 889 (2009)
(holding that due process required a judge to recuse himself when sitting on a case
involving someone who contributed significant money to his campaign).
11 See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003) ("Context matters
when reviewing race-based governmental action under the Equal Protection Clause.").
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should be upheld for some other reason.116 On this score, the
"context matters" explanation for cases such as Humanitarian
Law and Williams- Yulee fails: not only were the results in those
cases different than in normal applications of strict scrutiny
(i.e., the challenged laws were upheld), but, more importantly,
the style of the scrutiny also differed (i.e., it featured
significantly more deference to the government).117
Thus, something truly different seemed to influence
decisions such as HumanitarianLaw and Williams-Yulee. The
particular contexts of those cases appear to have triggered not
only unusual results, given the rules they were presumably.
applying, but also applications of strict scrutiny that were
themselves unusual in their deference and leniency. That latter
conclusion calls into question any claim that the Roberts Court
has consistently adhered to a strict scrutiny "rule," upholding

116 This distinction finds an echo in Lewis Kaplow's explanation of the
difference between rules and standards. In 1992, Kaplow wrote:
Arguments about and definitions of rules and standards commonly emphasize
the distinction between whether the law is given content ex ante or ex post. For
example, a rule may entail an advance determination of what conduct is
permissible, leaving only factual issues for the adjudicator. (A rule might
prohibit "driving in excess of 55 miles per hour on expressways.") A standard
may entail leaving both specification of what conduct is permissible and factual
issues for the adjudicator. (A standard might prohibit "driving at an excessive
speed on expressways.").
Lewis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557,
559-60 (1992) (footnotes omitted). Analogously, a rule requiring that a content-based
speech restriction be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest leaves,
at least ostensibly, "only factual issues for the adjudicator"-namely, is the law in fact
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest? Id. at 560. By contrast, a
decision by a court to defer to government's judgments about those issues reflects a
standard-like specification of the underlying law (here, that deference to the government
is allowed) as well as the determination of factual issues. To be sure, deference
determinations are not exactly "specification[s] of what conduct is permissible." Id. But
nor are they fact-specific applications of a preexisting rule. If anything, such
determinations constitute part of the legal backdrop framing the adjudicator's resolution
of the factual issues.
117 Indeed, in Williams-Yulee, Chief Justice Roberts implicitly established the
test for whether what he did for the majority in that case constituted application of a
"rule" of content neutrality or whether he did something more standard-like. He wrote:
"The Florida Bar faces a demanding task in defending Canon 7C(1) against Yulee's First
Amendment challenge. We have emphasized that 'it is the rare case' in which a State
demonstrates that a speech restriction is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
interest. But those cases do arise." Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 444 (2015)
(quoting Burson v. Freeman, 504 U. S. 191, 211 (1992) (plurality opinion)). This
statement suggests that the rule-that a content-based law requires the government to
"demonstrate[] that a speech restriction is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
interest"-is fixed, with the only question being the factual one of the law's conformance
to it. Id. This article suggests that the Court's application of that rule sometimes reflects
a different understanding of the burden the government faces in defending content-based
speech restrictions, with the result that it essentially constituted application of a
standard rather than a rule.
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some statutes simply because, once in a great while, a statute
will actually be narrowly tailored to further a compelling
government interest. Instead, the Court appears to be applying
different levels of scrutiny while claiming to apply one level
completely consistently and just happening to reach different
results.118
2. Extending the Content-Neutrality Rule
One might wonder whether such deception would also
overtake any attempt by the justices to extend the contentneutrality rule to compelled speech. Since its seminal decision in
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, the Court
has insisted that government compulsion of private speech is at
least as constitutionally problematic as its restriction of
speech.119 Over the last generation, the Court has applied that
principle not just to compelled speech, but to laws that compel
private parties to subsidize the speech of other parties.120 Even
more recently, the Court has flirted with importing the contentneutrality rule into the realm of speech compulsions.
Barnette is generally understood to be the foundation of
the Court's compelled speech jurisprudence.121 In Barnette, the
Court struck down a school authority's requirement, imposed
very soon after the nation's entry into World War II, that
students regularly salute the American flag and recite the
Pledge of Allegiance.122 Writing for the Court, Justice Jackson
explained that the strong rule against restricting "the
expression of opinion," firmly established by the time the case
11s By comparison, one might recall a dormant commerce clause case, Maine
v.
Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986), where the Court seemed to have concluded that the state
discrimination against interstate commerce was in fact the only tool it had to promote
its legitimate government interest.
119 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 633 ("It is now a commonplace that censorship or
suppression of expression of opinion is tolerated by our Constitution only when the
expression presents a clear and present danger of action of a kind the State is empowered
to prevent and punish. It would seem that involuntary affirmation could be commanded
only on even more immediate and urgent grounds than silence.").
120 See, e.g., Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234-35 (1977) (striking
down state statutory provision that compelled nonmembers of an employee union to
subsidize the union's political activities), overruled on other grounds by Janus v. Am.
Fed'n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018); United States
v. United Foods, 533 U.S. 405, 411, 413 (2001) (invalidating federal program that
compelled fresh mushroom handlers to subsidize mushroom advertisements).
121
See, e.g., Abner S. Greene, Barnette and Masterpiece Cakeshop: Some
Unanswered Questions, 13 FIU L. REV. 667, 667 (2019) ("Barnette is rightly seen as the
foundation of the Supreme Court's compelled speech doctrine.").
122 See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 626 (stating this history). In striking down that
authority's decision, the Court overruled its three-year old opinion in Minersville School
Districtv. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), which had upheld such compelled pledges.
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was decided, applied with perhaps even greater force to
government attempts to compel speech.123 Using language that
has since become canonical, he wrote: "If there is any fixed star
in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or
petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens
to confess by word or act their faith therein."124
Three decades later, the Court applied Barnette in Wooley
v. Maynard.125 Wooley involved a challenge to the State of New
Hampshire's requirement that owners of passenger automobiles
display a state license plate that proclaimed the state's motto,
"Live Free or Die."126 Conceding that the compelled flag salute in
Barnette "involved a more serious infringement upon personal
liberties than the passive act of carrying the state motto on a
license plate," the Court nevertheless concluded that "the
difference is essentially one of degree."127 Quoting Barnette, the
Wooley Court concluded that the compelled display of the state's
preferred message on license plates "invades the sphere of
intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment
to our Constitution to reserve from all official control."128
In recent years, the Court has applied both compelled
speech and compelled association principles to ratchet up its
scrutiny of compelled subsidization of other persons' speech,
strengthening a principle that dates back to at least a case
decided at nearly the same moment as Wooley.129 In 2018, it
struck down a state law requiring non-union member publicsector employees in a closed union shop to contribute so-called
"agency fees" to defray the union's collective bargaining
expenditures. In that case, Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31,130 the
Court applied earlier precedents holding that such fees triggered
123 See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 633 ("It is now a commonplace that censorship or
suppression of expression of opinion is tolerated by our Constitution only when the
expression presents a clear and present danger of action of a kind the State is empowered
to prevent and punish. It would seem that involuntary affirmation could be commanded
only on even more immediate and urgent grounds than silence.").
124
Id. at 642.
126
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
126 Id. at 706-07.
127 Id. at 715.
128
Id. (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642).
129
See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 225-26, 235-36 (1977)
(upholding a state law requiring non-union members in a public sector union closed-shop
workplace to subsidize the union's collective bargaining activities, but striking down
nonmembers' compelled subsidizations of the union's political speech). Abood was
decided on May 23, 1977, see id. at 209, while Wooley was decided on April 20, 1977, see
Wooley, 430 U.S. at 705.
Janus v. Am. Fed'n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448
130
(2018).
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"exacting" scrutiny, even though those fees were limited to
defraying the union's collective bargaining activities, rather
than its more explicitly political speech.11 The Court in Janus
expressly declined to apply the strict scrutiny that the plaintiff
called for, concluding that the union fee scheme failed even the
less stringent "exacting" scrutiny that had been established by
earlier caselaw.132 Despite opting for the lesser scrutiny
standard, the Janus Court's review was markedly more
skeptical than that applied in earlier cases, which largely
accepted Congress's determination that the union closed shop
was an essential part of harmonious industrial relations.133
In another 2018 case, the Court turned its attention to the
proper standard for judging compelled speech itself. In that case,
NIFLA v. Becerra,134 the Court stepped right up to the line of
declaring that content-based speech compulsions generally
trigger strict scrutiny. In NIFLA, the Court struck down a
California law that required so-called pregnancy crisis centers
(run by persons opposed to abortion) to post information about the
availability of low-cost abortions the state offered.16 Reading that
law as a government compulsion of such centers' speech, the
Court began its First Amendment analysis by noting that it was
"a content-based regulation of speech."136 It then rejected the
appellate court's refusal to apply strict scrutiny, which the lower
court had justified based on its conclusion that the speech in
question was professional speech that was thereby more
amenable to regulation.137 However, after seemingly setting the
stage for an application of strict scrutiny, the Court declined to do
so, since, in its view, the law failed even intermediate scrutiny.138
NIFLA's resemblance to Janus is clear. Indeed, NIFLA
sent an even stronger message about the application of the
content-neutrality rule in compelled speech or subsidy
situations. Janus merely acknowledged the plaintiff's argument
See id. at 2460-61, 2466.
See id. at 2465. See also supra note 113 for discussion of a 2021 case that
potentially sheds more light on "exacting scrutiny."
133 See Abood, 431 U.S. at 222 ("[T]he judgment clearly made in [Railway
Employes'Departmentv. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956)] and [International Association of
Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961)] is that such interference as exists is
constitutionally justified by the legislative assessment of the important contribution of
the union shop to the system of labor relations established by Congress.").
134 Nat'l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
135
The Court also struck down a requirement that unlicensed facilities post a
notice to that effect. See id. at 2376-78.
131
132

136
137

Id. at 2371.
Id. at 2371-75.

138 The Court also explained its refusal to apply strict scrutiny on the ground
that some thus-far unknown justification might exist for exempting professional speech
from the standard content-neutrality rule. See id. at 2375.
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for strict scrutiny before concluding it was unnecessary to reach
that issue. By contrast, before it similarly declined to apply strict
scrutiny, NIFLA laid out the building blocks for doing so when
it described the law as content-based and critiqued the lower
court's reasons for refusing to apply strict scrutiny.

Despite its last-minute retreat from the precipice,
NIFLA's classification of the California law as content-based and
its critique of the lower court's refusal to apply strict scrutiny send
an unmistakable message about the Court's underlying views
toward most speech compulsions. As Justice Breyer observed in
his NIFLA dissent, most speech compulsions are content based.139
To be sure, not all of them are: for instance, when a 1970s-era
California law required shopping mall owners to open their
property to persons who wished to speak (for example, by
soliciting petition signatures), the Court distinguished Wooley on
the ground that the California law did not specify the content
(much less the viewpoint) of the speech it compelled.14Q
Nevertheless, as Justice Breyer noted in his NIFLA dissent, most
run-of-the-mill disclosure laws-like a requirement that
landlords inform their tenants of garbage disposal procedureswould count as content based under the Court's modern approach
to identifying content discrimination.1 In turn, under the Court's
analysis in NIFLA, a content-based speech compulsion would
normally trigger strict scrutiny.

Such a move would constitute a significant change in the
of the Court's two foundational compelled speech
Neither
law.
cases-Barnette and Wooley-rested on a rigid application of the
content-neutrality rule. Barnette, of course, was decided decades
before the formal announcement of the content-neutrality rule in
Police Department of the City of Chicago v. Mosley,142 but Wooley
189

See id. at 2380 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("Virtually every disclosure law could

be considered content based, for virtually every disclosure law requires individuals to
speak a particular message." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
140 See Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robbins, 447 U.S. 74, 79, 87 (1980) ("[N]o
specific message is dictated by the State to be displayed on appellants' property. There
consequently is no danger of governmental discrimination for or against a particular
message."). In part on that ground, the Court distinguished Wooley. See id. at 85-87.
See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2380-81 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Reed v.
141
Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 175-78 (2015) (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment)). In
Reed, the Court held that any facial discrimination on the basis of content renders a law
content based for First Amendment purposes, regardless of whether the government had
a censorial motive. Reed, 576 U.S. at 165-68. Reed's broad definition of content.
neutrality is also problematic. See Araiza, supra note 51, at 881-86. This article does not
directly engage Reed, although Reed's rigid approach to the content discrimination
question is certainly consistent with the phenomena this article discusses.
Police Dep't of the City of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) ("[A]bove all else,
142
the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of
its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content."). But see William E. Lee, Modernizing
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was decided five years after Mosley and thus could have drawn on
Mosley as a precedent. Nevertheless, Wooley instead stressed the
New Hampshire license plate law's requirement that the
individual affirm an ideological position with which he disagreed.143
That focus placed Wooley squarely in the tradition of Barnette's
concern about viewpoint neutrality in the context of compulsions of
ideological statements, illustrated by Wooley's heavy reliance on
Barnette.14 The foundational case on the constitutionality of
compelled non-union member subsidization of a union's activities
in a public-sector workplace, decided contemporaneously with
Wooley,145 also followed in that tradition.146 That case, Abood v.
Detroit Board of Education,147 held that cases such as Barnette
"prohibit the [government] from requiring any of the [non-union
members] to contribute to the support of an ideological cause he
may oppose as a condition of holding a [government] job."14s Later

the Law of Open-Air Speech: The Hughes Court and the Birth of Content-NeutralBalancing,
13 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 1219, 1237 (2005) (finding precursors of the content-neutrality
principle in the 1930s).
14
See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1997) ("Here, as in Barnette, we
are faced with a state measure which forces an individual, as part of his daily life-indeed
constantly while his automobile is in public view-to be an instrument for fostering public
adherence to an ideological point of view he finds unacceptable. In doing so, the State
'invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment
to our Constitution to reserve from all official control."' (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ.
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943))); Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715 (describing the difference
between the compulsions in Barnette and Wooley as one "essentially ... of degree"); see also
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642 ("If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is
that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism,
religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
therein."). To be sure, the Court in Wooley, after identifying "the Maynards' interests" in
terms reflecting Barnette's concern with compelling ideological statements, went on to
inquire "whether the State's countervailing interest is sufficiently compelling to justify
requiring appellees to display the state motto on their license plates." Wooley, 430 U.S. at
715-16. Even more specifically, it then observed that even a "legitimate and substantial"
government interest "cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal
liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved." Id. Despite these invocations of
tests that imply the modern content-neutrality rule, it remains the case that such
invocations were triggered, not by the New Hampshire law's simple content discrimination,
but instead the law's compulsion of an ideological statement.
14 See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714-15; see also Marjorie Heins, Viewpoint Discrimination,
24 HASTINGS CoNST. L.Q. 99,105(1996) (noting Barnette's focus on viewpoint neutrality).
145 That foundational case, Abood v. DetroitBoard of Education, was decided on May
23, 1977, while Wooley was decided a little over a month earlier on April 20, 1977.
146 To be sure, that case, Abood, was overruled in 2018.
147 Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 210 (1977), overruled by Janus v.
Am. Fed'n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018).
148
Abood, 431 U.S. at 235; see also Genevieve Lakier, Not Such a Fixed Star After
All: West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, and the Changing Meaning of the
First Amendment Right Not to Speak, 13 FIU L. REV. 741, 745 (2019) ("For the first three
decades after it was handed down,... [w]hen the Court cited Barnette, it invariably did so as
support for the proposition that the government could not require its citizens to 'contribute to
the support of an[y] ideological cause [they] may oppose' or to attest to beliefs they did not
hold." (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Abood, 431 U.S. at 235)).
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compelled subsidy cases similarly rested on whether it was
ideological speech that was being forcibly subsidized.149
What would be the impact of a decision to subject to strict
scrutiny all content-based speech compulsions and subsidizations,
even if they did not compel an ideological stance? Certainly, one
result would be that courts could no longer account for the difference
between government compulsion of an ideological view and
compulsion of a nonideological one, or even a view with which the
compelled speaker or funder did not particularly disagree.150 Such a
rigid standard would thus abandon the Court's earlier preoccupation
with compulsions of ideological beliefs. That preoccupation was
deeply grounded: as Justice Jackson made clear in Barnette,
compelling a person to utter something they did not believe was, if
anything, more problematic than prohibiting him from speaking.151
The compulsion of ideological statements stands at the core of that
harm.62 Pre-NIFLA decisions' emphasis on that core free speech
right' stands in at least some tension with any judicial doctrine that
imposes the same test to any speech compulsion, no matter its
circumstances-the rule the Court strongly hinted at in NIFLA.
To be sure, the Court in NIFLA acknowledged precedentZauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of
Ohio-allowing the compulsion of statements that presented
"purely factual and uncontroversial information about the terms
under which . .. services will be available."163 In addition, at the end
149 See Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 469-70 (1997)
(distinguishing Abood and other compelled subsidy cases on the same ground); Keller v.
State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 13-14, 17 (1990) (describing Abood as holding that "a union
could not expend a dissenting individual's dues for ideological activities not 'germane' to
the purpose for which compelled association was justified: collective bargaining" and
distinguishing state bar expression germane to the association's regulation of the
practice of law from expression reflecting ideological viewpoints).
150
See Wileman, 521 U.S. at 471 (noting that "[w]ith trivial exceptions ... none
of the generic advertising [challenged in that case] conveys any message with which
respondents disagree").
161 See supra note 119 and accompanying text; see also Howard M. Wasserman,
Compelled Expression and the Public Forum Doctrine, 77 TUL. L. REv. 163, 191 (2002)
(describing as "the heart of Barnette"the principle "prohibiting government interference with
individual thought, conscience, or belief through a requirement that one adopt, present, or
support any message or idea that she does not wish to adopt, present, or support").
152
See, e.g., B. Jessie Hill, The Deliberative-PrivacyPrinciple:Abortion, Free Speech,
and Religious Freedom, 28 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 407, 411 (2019) ("Despite the
expansiveness of the First Amendment right to free speech, it is possible to identify at least one
truly core aspect of that right: the right to be free from compelled ideological speech, exemplified
in cases such as West Vrginia State Boardof Educationv. Barnette." (footnote omitted)).
Nat'l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2372, 2366 (2018)
13
(quoting Zauderer v. Off. of Disciplinary Counsel of the Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651
(1985)). However, the Court distinguished Zauderer on the ground that the California law
required posting of information about services that the clinics did not provide (abortion) and
because abortion was "anything but an 'uncontroversial' topic." NJFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2372.
Such a narrow reading of Zauderer-inparticular, a reading that limits it to compulsions of
statements about services the compelled speaker itself provides-continues to protect persons
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of its analysis of the abortion-availability speech compulsion,14 the
Court also tacked on, without citation to precedent, a seemingly
offhand statement that it did not "question the legality of health and
safety warnings long considered permissible."16
NIFLA's
acknowledgement of the legitimacy of such speech compulsions
suggests that the Court will continue to exempt at least some speech
compulsions from strict scrutiny.
Still, these carve-outs from the Court's presumptive strict
scrutiny rule raise questions about their manipulability. First, the
NIFLA Court read Zauderer quite narrowly. For example, it
observed that Zauderer compelled speech about services the
speaker itself provided.156 It found that feature to be absent in
NIFLA because, even though the pregnancy crisis centers offered
family planning and prenatal services, they did not provide the
abortions that were the subject of the state's compelled message. 1 7
Leave aside the question whether the NIFLA Court's narrow
interpretation of Zauderer is consistent with Zauderer's own
analysis, which appeared to focus not on whether the compelled
speech related to services the compelled speaker itself offered, but
rather whether the compelled speech was ideological in nature. 158

Instead, assume that NIFLA correctly read Zauderer.169Depending
against speech compulsions that do not require ideological affirmations. Indeed, Justice
Breyer's dissent in NFLA insisted that Zauderer itself recognized that its carve-out allowing
uncontroversial compelled disclosures extended to disclosures that did not implicate
ideological statements. See id. at 2387 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("Where a State's requirement
to speak 'purely factual and uncontroversial information' does not attempt 'to "prescribe what
shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens
to confess by word or act their faith therein,"' it does not warrant heightened scrutiny."
(quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 642 (1943)))).
-54 NIFLA also struck down another mandated posting, which this article does
not address.
165 NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2376.
166 Zauderer dealt with, among other things, a requirement that lawyers
advertising contingent fee arrangements disclose that clients might still be liable for
some costs even if the lawsuit was unsuccessful. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 633.
157 See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2372.
168 That question is a real one. Zauderer, after citing the canonical compelled
speech cases such as Barnette and Wooley, concluded that the lawyer advertising
compelled statements were of a different order:
[T]he interests at stake in this case are not of the same order as those discussed
in Wooley, Tornillo, and Barnette. Ohio has not attempted to "prescribe what
shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion
or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein." [Barnette,] 319
U.S. at 642. The State has attempted only to prescribe what shall be orthodox
in commercial advertising.
Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642); see also NIFLA, 138 S. Ct.
at 2387 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority's reading of Zauderer).
159 But see supra note 153 (citing Justice Breyer's disagreement with how the
NIFLA majority read Zauderer).
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on how broadly or narrowly future cases understand what speech
relates to the compelled speaker's own services, NIFLA could mark
a real limitation on Zauderer's deferential review of
"uncontroversial" speech compulsions related to the services the
speaker itself offered. NIFLA's own application of Zauderer-that
is, its conclusion that Zauderer did not apply because the
pregnancy crisis centers did not offer abortions, even though they
offered other services related to childbirth-raises doubts about the
predictability of Zauderer's carve-out. For example, could a state
require cell phone stores to post notices that the state makes lowcost landlines available to poor households if those stores do not
sell landline services? Could it require bars or casinos to post
notices offering, respectively, low-cost alcoholism or gambling
addiction treatment? Justice Breyer offered several other examples
of disclosures that may not come within the majority's reading of
what Zauderer allows government to require.160 NIFLA leaves such
questions undecided and unclear.
Second, the majority's "general disclaimer"181 about "health
and safety warnings long considered permissible"162 creates similar
uncertainty about its meaning. A Ninth Circuit en banc panel has
already grappled with this uncertainty, with one judge reading the
Court's disclaimer similarly to the Chaplinsky categories of
unprotected speech-that is, as allowing only compelled health and
safety warnings whose lineage trace back to 1791.163 That
understanding might seem implausible: as the appellate majority
noted, Justice Thomas's disclaimer came in response to Justice
Breyer's dissent, which identified health and safety disclosures
addressing modern technologies.164 On the other hand, the very
generality of NIFLA's disclaimer calls out for principled
elaboration. The appellate judge in question-in some ways, quite
logically-provided that principled reasoning, slotting the
disclaimer into the Court's existing methodology governing
unprotected speech more generally: that is, the historical approach
the Court has read into the Chaplinsky exclusions.165
The Ninth Circuit's division on this question exemplifies
Justice Breyer's concern that unreasoned carve-outs from a general
160

See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2380-81 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

161

Id.

162 Id. at 2376 (majority opinion); see also id. at 2379, 2381 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (quoting the majority's language).
163
See Am. Beverage Ass'n v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 916 F.3d 749, 762
(9th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (Ikuta, J., dissenting from most of the reasoning, concurring in
the result). Compare id., with Am. Beverage Ass'n, 916 F.3d at 756 n.4 (majority opinion)
(disputing Judge Ikuta's reasoning).
164
See Am. Beverage Ass'n, 916 F.3d at 756 n.4.
165 See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
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strict scrutiny rule will entice litigants to challenge mandated
disclosures. As he said, the resulting uncertainty would likely
trigger litigation that "invites courts around the Nation to apply an
unpredictable First Amendment to ordinary social and economic
regulation, striking down disclosure laws that judges may disfavor,
while upholding others, all without grounding their decisions in
reasoned principle."166 That unpredictability rests, at least in part,
on the character of the Court's carve-out as vaguely worded and
lacking any content deriving from precedent.167
To be sure, the Court's concession that not all content-based
speech compulsions are created equal sends a welcome signal,
albeit one that stands in some tension with the Court's tendency to
draw a strict doctrinal line between content-based and contentneutral laws. Nevertheless, the Court's refusal to ground its
distinctions in an explicitly stated line between ideological and
nonideological compulsions will likely create the litigation Justice
Breyer feared and the disagreements featured in the Ninth Circuit
case. Even more importantly, because the decision on any such
carve-out will likely determine the ultimate fate of the challenged
law, courts may feel tempted to manipulate the Court's vague,
unreasoned language in order to reach the results they want.
Concededly, an ideological versus nonideological line might
generate similar temptations. However, that line's greater
specificity and grounding in existing law would likely mitigate the
potential for mischief. Reliance on such a line would also better
align this aspect of the compelled speech doctrine with its
conceptual foundations.168
B.

The Manipulationof Categories: Government Speech
A similar manipulation of a threshold free speech

question arose in 2015 in a case implicating the so-called

government speech doctrine.169 The government speech inquiry
NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2381 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
The degree of that unpredictability would also surely depend in part on future
courts' decisions to apply a historical test to such carve-outs, given the extreme malleability
of any inquiry into whether a warning about a modern health or safety risk had a historical
analogue. See Am. Beverage Ass'n, 916 F.3d at 762 (Ikuta, J., dissenting from most of the
reasoning, concurring in the result) (applying such a historical approach).
168 See Hill, supra note 152, at 411; Lakier, supra note 148, at 743 (describing
the freedom protected in Barnette as "the freedom to express whatever 'belief
and ... attitude of mind' one desired") (alteration in original) (quoting W. Va. State Bd.
of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 633 (1943)).
169 The government speech doctrine holds that, when government is deemed to be
the speaker in a given context, it is not required to abide by foundational First Amendment
principles such as the content- and viewpoint-neutrality rules. See, e.g., Pleasant Grove
City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467-69 (2009) (describing the concept of government
166
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itself is not governed by a rigid scrutiny test.1 70 However,
because the doctrine uses the government speech label as an
explicitly outcome-determinative category of speech,171 it raises
similar concerns about doctrinal manipulation.
Even more than scrutiny levels, the categories into which
speech is slotted can be decisive to the constitutionality of a
given speech restriction. For example, categorizing speech as

incitement removes much of its constitutional protection,172 but
concluding that incendiary political speech is not incitement
gives it strong protection, given the centrality of political speech

to the First Amendment.173 Similarly, concluding that a
government employee's speech occurred as part of the
employee's normal work responsibilities completely removes it
from First Amendment protection,174 while a contrary conclusion
triggers a balancing test that may result in a decision protecting
the speech.75
The most recent controversy about such categorizations
deals with the attribution of particular speech to the government
or to private persons. As with other categorization decisions, the
government speech/private speech decision is critical to the
ultimate fate of a First Amendment claim. Government speech
is understood to be free of any First Amendment restrictions
even when a different categorization would trigger strong

speech). For a thorough discussion of the government speech idea, see generally HELEN
NORTON, THE GOVERNMENTS SPEECH AND THE CONSTITUTION (2019).
170
See, e.g., Summum, 555 U.S. at 470-80 (applying various considerations to
determine that a large monument in a city park constitutes government speech, without
any application of tiered scrutiny); id. at 470 ("Permanent monuments displayed on
public property typically represent government speech.").
171 See, e.g., Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 553 (2005) ("[T]he
Government's own speech .. . is exempt from First Amendment scrutiny.").
172
The qualifier "much of" is necessary because of the Court's conclusion in
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992), that even "unprotected" speech remains
protected from content-based restrictions that are not aimed at the reason such speech
falls into the unprotected category. See id. at 383-86; id. at 383-84 ("We have sometimes
said that these categories of expression are 'not within the area of constitutionally
protected speech,' or that the 'protection of the First Amendment does not extend' to
them. Such statements must be taken in context, however, and are no more literally true
than is the occasionally repeated shorthand characterizing obscenity 'as not being speech
at all.' What they mean is that these areas of speech can, consistently with the First
Amendment, be regulated because of their constitutionally proscribable content
(obscenity, defamation, etc.)-not that they are categories of speech entirely invisible to
the Constitution, so that they may be made the vehicles for content discrimination
unrelated to their distinctively proscribable content." (citations omitted)).
173
See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 329 (2010)
(describing political speech as "speech that is central to the meaning and purpose of the
First Amendment").
174 See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006).
175
See, e.g., Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228, 237-41 (2014) (finding that the
requisite balancing fell on the side of protecting the employee's speech).
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protection. 176 For example, if speech held to be private was made
in a public forum177 and subjected to a content-based restriction,
it would enjoy a strong presumption of constitutional protection.

By contrast, if that same speech was held to be governmental,
then the government would have free rein to shape it to its
liking. Obviously, then, much rides on the initial categorization
decision, and thus, on the coherence of the criteria governing
that decision.
This exact situation-a categorization of speech as
government speech when otherwise it would have been private
speech in a public forum restricted on the basis of its contentarose in Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans,
Inc.178 At issue in Walker was Texas's specialty license plate
program, under which interested persons could seek the state's
approval for license plates featuring particular designs and
wording.179 A confederate memorial group sued when the state
denied approval for its design, which featured an image of the
confederate battle flag.so
The question in Walker was whether the speech produced
pursuant to Texas's specialty license plate program constituted
government speech or whether the program created a public
forum for private speech.181 As explained above, this question
was critical to the eventual outcome of the lawsuit, since
government is permitted to favor particular topics and propound
particular viewpoints when it engages in its own speech, but is

largely precluded from doing so when it creates a forum for
private speech.182
The Court, in a 5-4 decision, concluded that the language
and images displayed pursuant to the program constituted

&

176 Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. at 553 ("[T]he Government's own
speech . .. is exempt from First Amendment scrutiny.").
177 The Court's forum doctrine categorizes among places where speech
is made,
triggering differing levels of scrutiny depending on the categorization of the location. Speech in
so-called public forums enjoys the highest level of constitutional protection, including the
content-neutrality rule. Speech in so-called non-public forums enjoys much less scrutiny; in such
locations, speech restrictions need only be viewpoint-neutral and reasonable. See Int'l Soc'y for
Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678-79 (1992) (setting forth this delineation). In
some cases, the Court has also spoken of '"limited public forum[s]'.. .where. . . government has
reserved a forum for certain groups or for the discussion of certain topics." Walker v. Tex. Div.,
Sons of Confederate Veterans, 576 U.S. 200, 215 (2015) (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector
Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995)).
178 Walker, 576 U.S. 200.
179 See id. at 203-04.
180 See id.
181 See id. at 215-17.
112
See id. at 207-08. See also supra note 177, which sets forth the basics of the
Court's forum doctrine.
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government speech.183 Writing for the majority, Justice Breyer
reached that conclusion after considering three factors: the
historical pedigree of state control of license plates, the public
identification of license plate speech with the state, and the
state's ultimate control over the designs private persons
offered.184 Writing for the dissenters, Justice Alito took issue
with each of these points.185 He observed that, while state-issued
license plates have existed for more than a century, specialty
plates of the sort at issue in Walker were of much more recent
vintage.186 He also ridiculed the majority's public perception
point, observing that Texas specialty plates included messages
(such as "Rather Be Golfing," advertisements for particular
businesses, and praise for out-of-state college athletic teams)
that simply could not be understood as reflecting the state
government's own views.187 Finally, he noted that the state had
approved the vast majority of proposed designs, thus rendering
illusory any claim that the state exercised meaningful control

over them.188 Beyond those factors, Justice Alito noted that the
main precedent case, his own opinion in the 2009 case Pleasant
Grove City v. Summum,189 relied on an additional factor that the
Walker majority conceded was absent in that case.1 90
Walker is controversial among scholars because of the green
light it allegedly gives governments to avoid the First
Amendment's content- and viewpoint-neutrality strictures by
claiming speech as its own. For example, Mary-Rose Papandrea
argues that Justice Breyer "manipulated" the history of specialty
license plates to favor the majority's government speech holding,
given his conflation of the long history of license plates in general
and the much more recent history of specialty plates.191 She also
notes the difficulty courts have faced in relying on the likely
impressions of a reasonable observer in the context of the Court's
See id. at 202 (showing the justices' line-up).
Id. at 210-14.
185
See generally id. at 221-36 (Alito, J., dissenting).
186 Id. at 223-24.
187 See id. at 222.
188 See id. at 231-32.
189 Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009).
190
Summum, which held that a large, permanent monument in a city park
constituted government speech, observed that space limitations prevented the city from
accommodating such structures from any person who wished to donate one to the city,
as would be presumptively required if the city's acceptance of one monument thus
created a public forum open to private speech. Id. at 478-81. As both the majority and
dissent noted in Walker, no such space limitations prevented Texas from accommodating
any and all license plate designs offered by individuals. See Walker, 576 U.S. at 214; id.
at 232-33 (Alito, J., dissenting).
191
Mary-Rose Papandrea, The Government Brand, 110 Nw. L. REV. 1195,
1210-12 (2016).
183
184
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establishment clause jurisprudence, and applies that observation
to Justice Breyer's conclusion that a reasonable observer would
impute specialty plates' speech to the state. 192 For example, she
questions the assumption that a reasonable observer, aware that
license plates are state property, would therefore impute speech on
the plates to the state. 198 She argues that such a conclusion would
seemingly undermine public forum law since it would mean that
private speech in such government-owned forums would be
imputable to the state, therefore rendering it unprotected.194
More generally, Professor Papandrea cites approvingly
Justice Alito's mocking evaluation of the majority's government
speech conclusion, including, for example, his incredulousness
that a reasonable observer would think that the state was
endorsing out-of-state college football teams. 195 Finally, she
expresses agreement with Justice Alito's skepticism about the
extent of the government's control over the license plate designs,
and worries that citing such control as a reason for imputing the
speech to the state will incentivize states to impose more
stringent review of proposed speech.196
Regardless of whether one agrees with critiques like these, a
more foundational question dogs the Court's analysis-and, indeed,
the entire government speech idea. Like incitement speech
discussed earlier, the government speech category is a binary: either
the speech is deemed to be government speech, or it is not. In the
context of government speech, this binary quality may be
inappropriate. This is not because the government speech
determination is likely outcome determinative. Other similarly
critical binary choices may be appropriate because of the nature of
the speech in question. Again, consider incitement. As noted
earlier,197 the determination of whether particular speech
constitutes incitement is likely critical to the constitutionality of any
restriction on that speech: if the speech is incitement, it is subject to
prohibition, but if it is not, then it is fully protected political speech.
But that binary is appropriate: speech really is either incitement or
192 Id. at 1215-18.
193 Id. at 1217.
194 Id. ("The Court [in Walker] appears to embrace what was
only a suggestion in
Summum-that the government's mere ownership of property has expressive value that
would be obvious to the reasonable observer. The Court's willingness to accept this
argument potentially turns the public forum doctrine on its head.. . . [T]he public forum
doctrine rejected the traditional assumption that the government had the same property
rights as private property owners to control the speech appearing on their property. The
appearance of private speech on public property cannot be sufficient to convert that speech
into government speech without eviscerating the public forum doctrine entirely.").
195 See id. at 1218.
196
Id. at 1220-22.
197 See supratext accompanying notes 172-173.
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it is not-it makes no sense to say that any particular statement is
both incitement and fully-protected political speech.198
Speech of the sort at issue in Walker is different. Even when
one bores down to its most granular character-beyond license
plates themselves to the speech comprising the specialty
design199-as a practical matter it remains quite difficult, and
perhaps nearly impossible, to categorize it as pure government

speech or as pure private speech. In 2008, Caroline Mala Corbin
correctly concluded that speech of this sort should be understood as
"mixed" speech-that is, speech that should be attributed to both
the government and private parties.200 Professor Corbin went on to
suggest that government limits on such speech should be subject to
intermediate scrutiny.201

This article does not conclusively analyze the question of
how to resolve the question posed when the speech at issue is
arguably the government's own. Instead, it raises the argument to
make a more foundational point, raised by Professor Corbin as
well: in borderline cases, attempts to categorize speech as purely
governmental or purely private may be deeply unsatisfactory.202
Yet current doctrine still subjects such borderline cases to a binary,
either-or analysis that, as noted earlier, is largely outcome
determinative. The specialty license plates in Walker are a prime
example of such borderline cases. Like rigid applications of the
content-neutrality rule, a binary yes-no answer to the government
speech question may lead to manipulation of the Court's analysis
in ways Justice Alito critiqued in his Walker dissent.203
It is ironic that categorization played the critical role that it
did in Walker, since the majority opinion was written by Justice
Breyer, who, of all the current justices, has cautioned most
198 To be sure, a given speech act-say, a speech or an exhortation on social
media-might contain elements that are protected speech and elements that are not.
See, e.g., Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 214 (1919) (discussing particular
statements made by the incitement defendant's speech to a crowd); Hess v. Indiana, 414
U.S. 105, 107 (1973) (analyzing one particular statement made by a protester when
determining whether his arrest was constitutional). But isolating any one such element
or part or statement and concluding that it constitutes both incitement and fully
protected speech is incoherent. As this article section explains, this is not the case with
speech of the sort at issue in Walker.
199 See Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, 576 U.S. 200, 220,
222-23 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting) (conceding that parts of the license plate may consist
of government speech while arguing that other parts, like the privately-proposed design
and language, do not).
200 See Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech: When Speech is Both Private and
Governmental, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 605, 610 (2008).
201 See id.
202 Id. at 607 ('"The trouble with [the private speechlgovernment speech]
dichotomy is that not all speech is purely private or purely governmental.").
203 See supra text accompanying notes 185-190, which recounts Justice
Alito's critique.
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frequently against overreliance on categorical rules in free speech
cases. 204 Of course, he was writing for a majority in Walker. That
fact may have limited his freedom to write the opinion he would
have preferred to write, especially since his narrow five-justice
majority included Justice Thomas, who likely would have been
hostile to a less categorical approach.20 Moreover, one must
concede that his approach to that binary either-or question itself
derived from the sort of multi-factor test Justice Breyer tends to
favor.206 Nevertheless, the categorization issue this article
discusses relates to the outcome of that test-the either-or answer
to the government speech question-rather than the analysis that
led to that outcome. When a context-specific, multi-factor test leads
to a binary conclusion that obscures the reality of the situation, the
same potential for manipulation exists as when the Court employs
rigid approaches more directly, as with the approaches exemplified
by the strict scrutiny and compelled speech cases this article has
already discussed.
III.

TOWARD A LAW OF LICENSE PLATES

Speech situations like those described above do not present
appropriate occasions for the application of rigid tests. The speech
restrictions in Humanitarian Law and Williams-Yulee reflect
contexts where, rightly or wrongly, the Court appeared to perceive
the government interest as one that required more judicial
deference. In Humanitarian Law, the Court accorded that
deference via its intricate and opaque verbal formulations that
seemed to seek to avoid uttering the phrase "strict scrutiny" and
indeed any scrutiny formula at all.207 In Williams-Yulee, it accorded
that deference through an application of strict scrutiny that, as
Justice Scalia demonstrated, was anything but strict.208 Despite the
Court's seeming recognition of a special need for deference in those
cases, the Court purported to apply longstanding precedent

requiring stringent scrutiny. Nevertheless, it did so in a way that
suggested sub silentio deviations.
NIFLA feinted toward a rule according strict scrutiny to
all content-based speech compulsions. But it eventually drew
204 See, e.g., Benjamin Pomerance, An Elastic Amendment: Justice Steven G.
Breyer's Fluid Conceptions of the Freedom of Speech, 79 ALB. L. REV. 403, 490-95 (2016).
205
Justice Thomas wrote the majority opinions in both Reed and NIFLA, both
of which are notable, the first for its application of a rigid content-neutrality rule, see
Araiza, supra note 51, at 881-86, 890-96; and the second for its strong hinting in that
direction, see supra Section II.A.2.
206 See supra text accompanying note 184.
207 See supra text accompanying notes 79-90.
208 See supra text accompanying notes 98-111.
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back, applying only intermediate scrutiny to the California law
while acknowledging both an exception derived from a (narrowly
read) Zauderer opinion and a second vaguely worded and
doctrinally unexplained carve-out for "health and safety
warnings long considered permissible."209 The Court's
acceptance of those latter caveats reflects the difficulty with a
broad application of the content-neutrality rule to all speech
compulsions. However, the ambiguities they create raise the
prospect of doctrinal manipulation.
Finally, the specialty license plate program at issue in
Walker resists definitive categorization as either government or
private speech.210 Even using Walker's own criterion of public
perception, one can readily intuit that reasonable observers would
understand Texas's specialty plates as a mixture of official
government speech (given the official nature of license plates) and
private speech (given the wide variety of private messages

communicated by the specialty designs).211 Drilling down to focus
on only the actual specialty designs and language themselves
yields the same intuition: presumably, most Texans know that
anything that goes on a license plate must somehow obtain
government approval, but they would also likely conclude that
"Rather Be Golfing"212 or "Get it Sold with RE/MAX'213 do not reflect
the state's official views. On the other hand, Texas acted as more
than a simple passive host for private expression, in contrast, for
example, with how it might have acted when renting a public
auditorium to a private speaker. Rather, a plausible intuition
suggests that the state's involvement in actually mandating the
display of license plates, manufacturing plates on which those
private messages appear, and affixing the state's name (and its
own speech) to that plate renders those plates something akin to a
speech joint venture. Once again, a rigid doctrinal rule-here, a
binary either-or decision on the government versus private speech
issue-does not account for that reality. And in turn, the failure to
See Nat'l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2372, 2376
209
(2018). See also supra text accompanying notes 134-141 for discussion of the majority's
and dissent's analyses in NIFLA.
210
See supra text accompanying notes 178-206 for discussion of Walker.
211 Indeed, in a subsequent case raising the question whether governmentissued trademarks constitute government speech, a unanimous Court speaking through
Justice Alito concluded that they did not, relying in part on the cacophony of messages
communicated by trademarks. See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1748 (2017) ("It is thus
far-fetched to suggest that the content of a registered mark is government speech. . . ."
If the federal registration of a trademark makes the mark government speech, "the
Federal Government is babbling prodigiously and incoherently.").
212 Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 576 U.S. 200,
221-22 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting).
213 Id. at 205 (majority opinion) (identifying this language).
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account for reality once again generated a judicial analysis that
obscures more than it enlightens.214

Nor do such rigid rules satisfactorily promote First
Amendment values.
Among others, Professor
Ronald
Krotoszynski has urged courts to adopt a context-specific
proportionality analysis in free speech cases, not as a complete

substitute for such rules, but as a complement when such rules
fail to adequately promote the democratic self-government that
he sees as the First Amendment's primary goal.21 Speaking in a
similar register, Justice Kagan has suggested that some
applications of rigid rules do little to promote the First
Amendment's underlying goals.216 Both perspectives reflect
dissatisfaction with exclusive reliance on such rules, even as
they recognize their utility at times.27 It is easy to sympathize
with these concerns. While most First Amendment categorical
rules trace back to the First Amendment's foundational
purposes, their rigid application over time risks converting those

rules into ends in themselves, rather than means to promote
those fundamental values.218 To prevent such a diversion of
courts' attention toward the rules themselves rather than those
underlying values, sensitivity to context is a must. To
paraphrase Justice White, we must create and apply a law of
specialty license plates.219
But how should courts account for such context
specificity? While this article cannot comprehensively canvass
and analyze possible answers, it can make several general
points. First, if the problem identified above really does boil
214 See, e.g., Papandrea, supra note 191, at 1209-26 (critiquing the Court's
analysis in Walker).
215
See generally Krotoszynski, supranote 19, at 153-54 (describing as a "caveat" to
his thesis the observation that "[I]t would be mistaken to posit that First Amendment
jurisprudence should not feature any bright line rules. Bright line rules can and do play an
important role in safeguarding the process of democratic deliberation from ham-fisted
government efforts to censor or even simply reshape the political marketplace of ideas. Even
so, however, bright line rules are not enough." (footnote omitted)).
216
See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 181 (2015) (Kagan, J., concurring
in judgment) ("Although the majority insists that applying strict scrutiny to all [facially
content-discriminatory] ordinances is 'essential' to protecting First Amendment
freedoms, I. find it challenging to understand why that is so.").
217 See Krotoszynski, supra note 19, at 153-54; Reed, 576 U.S. at 182 (Kagan,
J., concurring in judgment) ("We apply strict scrutiny to facially content-based
regulations of speech ... when there is any 'realistic possibility that official suppression
of ideas is afoot."' (quoting Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass'n, 551 U.S. 177, 189 (2007)).
218 See, e.g., Reed, 576 U.S. at 181-83 (Kagan, J., concurring in judgment)
(arguing that the content-neutrality rule is best understood as reflecting more
foundational goals of preventing government distortion of public debate, and thus
critiquing the majority's application of that rule in a context where there was little risk
of such distortion).
219 See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 501 (1981).
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down to one of acontextual overgeneralization, then the obvious
answer is to give more weight to context-and to do so explicitly.
In cases such as HumanitarianLaw and Williams-Yulee, that
contextualization would entail explicitly recognizing that some
speech restrictions merit more deferential scrutiny. In NIFLA,
it would entail recognizing a constitutional difference between
compulsions of ideological viewpoints and nonideological ones.
In Walker, it would entail recognizing that specialty license
plates simply do not fit into a neat government speech versus
private speech binary.

Such contextualization may be promoted by the sort of
proportionality analysis Justice Breyer has often advocated. Such
analysis, by inquiring into the degree of First Amendment harm
and the extent to which the government action pursues its
interests with minimal impact on free speech interests, can more
realistically account for the type of fact- and context-intensive
situations this article contemplates. For example, it would more
transparently account for both the deference the Court seemed to
think was owed to the political branches in HumanitarianLaw and
the underinclusiveness arising from the fact that the judicial ethics
canon in Williams-Yulee left open paths for judicial candidates to
request expressions of support that did not amount to campaign

contributions. A focus on First Amendment harm would fit
particularly well within the exceptions and carve-outs the NIFLA
majority created from the otherwise-broad strict scrutiny regime it
hinted at, by providing a principled basis for those exceptions and
carve-outs. In particular, such a focus would easily accommodate
an emphasis on whether the challenged law compelled statements
of ideological belief. Finally, such analysis could avoid the binary
choice imposed by current government speech doctrine, as
demonstrated by Walker.
To be sure, analysis of this sort raises its own problems of
analytical
and
decision-making
judicial
outcome-driven
that the
protested
Alito
Justice
Walker,
In
inconsistency.220
as
speech
majority's decision identifying specialty plate
government speech effectively allowed government to discriminate
against certain content and viewpoints.221 He noted that the
Court's characterization of that speech as governmental allowed
the state to refuse the confederate flag plate design because of
protests while still accepting another design that commemorated
220 See, e.g., Krotoszynski, supra note 19, at 153 ("Balancing tests can give rise to an
appearance of content, viewpoint, or even speaker discrimination because reasonable jurists
can and will reach conflicting results in cases featuring very similar facts.').
221 See Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, 576 U.S. 200, 227
(2005) (Alito, J., dissenting).
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the "Buffalo Soldiers" who fought in the military's "IndianWars"
after the Civil War, despite anguished opposition from Native
American groups. 222 It is easy to imagine protests that the sort of
approach suggested here opens the door to similar outcome-based
decision-making by explicitly allowing judges to consider factual
contexts when deciding cases.
Perhaps a balancing approach might lead to an incoherent,
purely ad hoc, First Amendment. Or perhaps not.223 But more
fundamentally, such an approach may force courts into delicate
line drawing situations. For example, if a judge following Justice
Breyer's general approach to free speech cases concludes that
government should have more leeway to restrict nonideological
messages on specialty plates because of the lesser First
Amendment harm such restrictions impose, then courts would be
faced with a barrage of cases whose outcome would turn on factintensive judgments about the ideological heft of the speech that is
being restricted. They would be faced with similar problems if an
ideological/nonideological line governed the scrutiny courts
accorded speech compulsions.
But such line drawing is already implicit in much of the
Court's free speech doctrine. Recall the Court's manipulation of
strict scrutiny itself in Humanitarian Law and Williams-Yulee,
suggesting the Court was applying special, ad hoc rules in speech

cases implicating national security and judicial speech.224 Recall
further that in NIFLA, the Court both recognized Zauderer's
allowance of compelled statements of "factual and uncontroversial
information"225 and did not "question the legality of health and safety
warnings long considered permissible."226 Lurking in those
exceptions to the majority's flirtation with an otherwise-broad
application of the content-neutrality rule to speech compulsions is
the prospect of the same sort of line drawing that would accompany
an ideological/nonideological speech line. Finally, recall the seeming
arbitrariness of Walker's all-or-nothing decision on the government

222
223

See

id.

See Krotoszynski, supra note 19, at 172 (arguing that "[o]ver time courts would
work out an analytical framework that establishes clear rules of the road (so to speak); as
decisions accrete over time, one would expect to see greater consistency of results. This is, in
important respects, the essence of the common law method of adjudication.").
224 Indeed, Justice Ginsburg's partial concurrence in Williams-Yulee explicitly
rested on her view that a special rule should apply to speech implicating judicial integrity
interests. See Williams-Yuled v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 457-62 (2015) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
22 Nat'l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2372 (2018)
(quoting Zauderer v. Off. of Disciplinary Counsel of the Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626,
651 (1985)).
226 Id. at 2376.
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speech question. The question, then, is not whether line drawing will
be done, but rather, whether it will be done transparently.227
CONCLUSION

Recognition of a speech restriction's factual surroundings,
or of the ideological quality of a speech compulsion, or of the reality
of mixed government/private speech: all these doctrinal moves
would reflect sensitivity to context of one sort or another. They all
push against acontextual rules: respectively, strict scrutiny for
all content-based speech restrictions and compulsions and a
binary yes-no answer to the government speech question. Each
of these moves would push free speech jurisprudence toward a
variety of different standards and approaches-a law of
billboards, as Justice White stated in Metromedia, or, as this
article suggests, a law of specialty license plates or national
security-justified speech restrictions.228 The resulting variety of
227 See, e.g., Corbin, supra note 200, at 677 (observing that "the current
categorization approach [that makes the government speech doctrine] is already ad hoc,
just not transparently so").
225 Such an approach would move the United States closer to the approach
taken by the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Article 10 of the ECHR,
after setting forth the basic right to freedom of expression, then continues as follows:
The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or
penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society,
in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for
the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for
the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the
disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the
authority and impartiality of the judiciary.
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 10,
¶ 2, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222. A quick perusal of these particular contexts
justifying limitations on the free expression right yields the initial impression that, in
fact, American law has found itself in approximately the same place as the ECHR,
through a combination of purported historically grounded exceptions to free speech
rights and de facto exceptions from the First Amendment's content-neutrality rule. See
Holder v. Humanitarian L. Project, 561 U.S. 1, 39-40 (2010) (upholding a national
security-based speech restriction); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490,
498 (1949) ("It rarely has been suggested that the constitutional freedom for speech and
press extends its immunity to speech or writing used as an integral part of conduct in
violation of a valid criminal statute."); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23-25, 36-37
(1973) (finding obscenity to be unprotected through a test that in part rests on the
offensiveness of the material); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343-48 (1974)
(announcing a test for when the First Amendment allows libel verdicts on matters of
public interest, based in part on the libel victim's interest in and ability to protect his
reputation); Cohen v. Cowles Media, 501 U.S. 663, 665-66, 669-70 (1991) (allowing a
contract cause of action to go forward, despite the First Amendment, when the plaintiff
sued a media company after the company breached its promise to keep his identity
confidential when publishing information he had provided the publisher); WilliamsYu-lee, 575 U.S. at 445-48, 456-57 (upholding a speech restriction justified as "protecting
the integrity of the judiciary" (internal quotation marks omitted)). This very quick
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approaches and tests that would arise from this splitting would
surely generate a very different free speech jurisprudence than
one resulting from the lumping229 that reflects the tendency to
apply (or purport to apply) unitary standards to vastly different
speech situations.230
Some might decry this disaggregation as an invitation to
results-based decision-making. As Justice Souter once
remarked, "[r]eviewing speech regulations under fairly strict
categorical rules keeps the starch in the standards for those
moments when the daily politics cries loudest for limiting what
may be said."231 But that benefit only obtains if courts are hardy
enough to actually add that starch. to their doctrinal laundry
loads. The Court's decisions in HumanitarianLaw, WilliamsYulee, and Walker-all cases in which dissenters perceived both
a less-than-robust application of the relevant law and outcomedriven reasons for that allegedly flawed application-give
reason to doubt that the Supreme Court is consistently up to
that task.232 For that reason, it might be more helpful if the Court
simply recognized that these situations themselves, as well as
those encompassed by the Court's underexplained carve-outs in
NIFLA, are sufficiently different such that different standardsand not just different applications of the purported same
standard-should apply. Perhaps there should indeed be a law
of specialty license plates. Perhaps that is the best we can hope
for in a world in which every speech situation really does "have
differing natures, values, abuses and dangers."233

comparison obviously does not comprehensively answer the question about the
underlying symmetry between the two legal systems, a question that lies far beyond the
scope of this article.
229 For a general discussion of the distinction between lumping and splitting
approaches in law, see Bradley C. Karkkainen, "New Governance"in Legal Thought and
in the World: Some Splitting as an Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 81 MINN. L. REV.
471, 479 & n.33 (2004) (explaining the concepts of "lumping" and "splitting" and citing
their relevance to various disciplines).
230 See generally Bhagwat, The Test, supra note 7 (discussing the wide use of
intermediate scrutiny in free speech law).
231 Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n,
518 U.S. 727, 774 (1996) (Souter, J., concurring) (citing Blasi, supra note 62, at 474
(arguing that "courts ... should place a premium on confining the range of discretion left
to future decisionmakers who will be called upon to make judgments when pathological
pressures are most intense" (alteration in original))).
232 For an additional doubt on this score, see Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444, 450, 454 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("When one reads the opinions closely and
sees when and how the 'clear and present danger' test has been applied, great misgivings
are aroused. First, the threats were often loud but always puny and made serious only
by judges so wedded to the status quo that critical analysis made them nervous.").
233 Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 97 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).

